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Abstract  
 
Influential work on reasoning and decision making has 
popularized the idea that sound reasoning requires correction 
of fast, intuitive thought processes by slower and more 
demanding deliberation. We present seven studies that 
question this corrective view of human thinking. We focused 
on the very problem that has been widely featured as the 
paradigmatic illustration of the corrective view, the well-
known bat-and-ball problem. A two-response paradigm in 
which people were required to give an initial response under 
time-pressure and cognitive load allowed us to identify the 
presumed intuitive response that preceded the final response 
given after deliberation. Across our studies we observe that 
correct final responses are often non-corrective in nature. 
Many reasoners who manage to answer the bat-and-ball 
problem correctly after deliberation already solved it 
correctly when they reasoned under conditions that 
minimized deliberation in the initial response phase. This 
suggests that sound bat-and-ball reasoners do not necessarily 
need to deliberate to correct their intuitions, their intuitions 
are often already correct. Pace the corrective view, findings 
suggest that in these cases they deliberate to verify correct 
intuitive insights.  
 
Keywords: Dual Process Theory; Heuristic Bias; Intuition; 
Deliberation; Two-Response Paradigm 
 
Introduction 
 
"The intellect has little to do on the road to 
discovery. There comes a leap in 
consciousness, call it intuition or what you 
will, and the solution comes to you and you 
don't know why or how."  
- Albert Einstein (as quoted by Oesper, 1975) 
 
"It is through logic that we prove, but through 
intuition that we discover."  
- Henri Poincaré (as quoted by Poincaré, 
1914) 
 
There are few problems in the reasoning and 
decision making field that attracted so much 
interest as the bat-and-ball problem. In its 
original formulation as it was first proposed by 
Frederick (2005) the problem states: 
 
“A bat and a ball together cost $1.10. The bat 
costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the 
ball cost?” 
 
Intuitively, the answer “10 cents” readily springs 
to mind. Indeed, this is the answer that most 
people tend to give (Bourgeois-Gironde & Van 
Der Henst, 2009; Frederick, 2005). However, 
although the answer seems obvious it is also dead 
wrong.  Clearly, if the ball costs 10 cents and the 
bat costs $1 more, then the bat would cost $1.10. 
In this case, the bat and ball together would cost 
$1.20 and not $1.10. After some reflection it is 
clear that the ball must cost 5 cents and the bat 
costs – at a dollar more - $1.05 which gives us a 
total of $1.10.  
 Many people who are presented with the 
bat-and-ball problem will attest that the “10 
cents” answer seems to pop-up in a split second 
whereas working to the “5 cents” solution seems 
to take more time and effort. As such, it is not 
surprising that the problem has been widely 
featured – from the scientific literature 
(Frederick, 2005; Kahneman, 2011; 
Mastrogiorgio & Petracca, 2014; Sinayev & 
Peters, 2015) to popular science best-sellers 
(Gladwell, 2005; Levitt & Dubner, 2010) to the 
pages of the Wall Street Journal (Lehrer, 2011) – 
as a textbook illustration of the dual process 
nature of human thinking.  
 The dual process model conceives of 
thinking as an interaction between intuitive and 
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deliberative processing, often referred to as 
System 1 and System 2 (e.g., Epstein, 1994; 
Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; 
Sloman, 1996). Although there are many types of 
dual process models they often postulate that the 
intuitive System 1 operates quickly and 
effortlessly whereas the deliberate System 2 is 
slower and effortful (i.e., it heavily burdens our 
limited cognitive resources)1. In the bat-and-ball 
problem it is System 1 that is assumed to be 
cueing the immediate “10 cents” response. 
Computation of the “5 cents” response is 
assumed to require the engagement of System 2 
(Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 
2005). Because human reasoners have a strong 
tendency to minimize demanding computations, 
they will often refrain from engaging or 
completing the slow System 2 processing when 
the fast System 1 has already cued a response 
(Kahneman, 2011). Consequently, most reasoners 
will simply stick to the System 1 response that 
quickly came to mind and fail to consider the 
correct response. Reasoners who do manage to 
solve the problem correctly will need to correct 
the initially generated intuitive response after 
having completed their System 2 computations 
(Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; 
Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010).  
 At the heart of the dual process model of 
the bat-and-ball problem lies a “corrective” view 
on sound reasoning and deliberation: Correct 
responding is assumed to require correction of an 
intuitive System 1 response by slower and more 
demanding System 2 processing (Kahneman, 
2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). This can 
easily lead to a somewhat grim characterization 
of System 1 as a source of error that needs 
supervision from the deliberate System 2 
                                                             
1 Operation speed and effort are typical correlates of 
System 1 and 2 processing. The idea is that these 
features have often been associated with System 1 and 
2 processing. But this does not necessarily need to be 
the case; the features do not necessarily need to align 
(e.g., a process might be effortless but slow, e.g., 
“incubation”, Gilhooley, 2016), and other features can 
be proposed to differentiate System 1 and 2 processing 
(e.g., “autonomy”, Pennycook, 2017). See Evans and 
Stanovich (2013), and the debate between Melnikoff 
and Bargh (2018) and Pennycook, De Neys, Evans, 
Stanovich, and Thompson (2018), for an extensive 
discussion.  
(Marewski & Hoffrage, 2015). Bluntly put, 
System 2 is portrayed as the good guy that cleans 
up the mess left behind by the fast but error prone 
System 1. To be clear, it should be stressed that 
the dual process model does not simply postulate 
that intuitions are always incorrect. It is not 
disputed that intuitive responses can be 
appropriate and helpful in some cases (Evans, 
2010; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 
2011; Sloman, 1996). Likewise, it is also not 
claimed that deliberation will necessarily lead to 
a correct answer (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 
Kahneman, 2011). The point is simply that 
intuitive responses have the potential to be 
incorrect and therefore need to be monitored and 
sometimes corrected. It is this corrective aspect 
of the model that can lead to the rather negative 
view of System 1. And it is this corrective nature 
of System 2 processing for which the bat-and-ball 
problem seems to present a paradigmatic 
example.  
 Although the corrective dual process 
model and related “intuition-as-bias” view have 
been very influential various scholars have called 
for a more positive view towards intuitive 
processing (e.g., Klein, 2004; Peters, 2012; 
Reyna, 2012). More generally, as our opening 
quotes illustrate, historically speaking, leading 
mathematicians and physicist have long favored a 
quite different look on intuition and deliberation. 
In scientific discoveries and mathematical 
breakthroughs intuition has often been conceived 
as guiding the intellect. Great minds such as 
Newton, Einstein, Poincaré, and Kukulé 
famously reported how their major breakthroughs 
– from the discovery of gravity to the Benzene 
ring structure – came to them intuitively 
(Ellenberg, 2015; Marewski & Hoffrage, 2015). 
Although this “intuition-as-a-guide” view does 
not deny that more effortful, deliberate thinking 
is indispensable to validate and develop an initial 
intuitive idea, the critical origin of the insight is 
believed to rely on intuitive processes (Ellenberg, 
2015; Marewski & Hoffrage, 2015). In contrast 
with the corrective dual process view, here sound 
reasoning is not conceived as a process that 
corrects erroneous intuitions but as a process that 
builds on correct insights.  
 The present study focuses on an 
empirical test of the corrective nature of sound 
reasoning in the bat-and-ball problem. Our 
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motivation was that although the problem is 
considered a paradigmatic example of the need to 
correct an initial intuitive response and has been 
widely used to promote this view, the critical 
corrective assumption has received surprisingly 
little direct empirical testing. Arguably, one of 
the reasons is that the characterization seems self-
evident from an introspective point of view. As 
we already noted, few people (including the 
present authors) would contest that it feels as if 
the “10 cents” answer pops up immediately and 
arriving at the “5 cents” solution requires more 
time and effort. Indeed, many scholars have 
referred to this introspective experience to 
warrant the corrective assumption (Frederick, 
2005; Kahneman, 2011). However, while 
introspection is not without its merits, it is also 
well established that introspective impressions 
can be deceptive (Mega & Volz, 2014; Schooler, 
Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993). 
 In addition to introspection, Frederick 
(2005) also cited some indirect support for the 
corrective assumption in the paper that 
introduced the bat-and-ball problem. For 
example,  Frederick observed that incorrect 
responders rate the problem as easier than correct 
responders and suggests that this presumably 
indicates that correct responders are more likely 
to consider both responses (see also Mata & 
Almeida, 2014; but see also Szaszi, Szollosi, 
Palfi, & Aczel, 2017). The problem is that 
although such assumptions are not unreasonable, 
they do not present conclusive evidence. Clearly, 
even when the assumption holds that correct 
responders are more likely to consider both the 
incorrect and correct responses, it does obviously 
not imply that they considered the incorrect 
response before the correct response. 
 Other potential support comes from 
latency studies. A number of studies reported that 
correct “5 cents” responses take considerably 
longer than incorrect “10 cents” responses (e.g., 
Alós-Ferrer, Garagnani, & Hügelschäfer, 2016; 
Johnson, Tubau, & De Neys, 2016; Stupple, 
Pitchford, Ball, Hunt, & Steel, 2017; Travers, 
Rolison, & Feeney, 2016). For example, in one of 
our own studies we observed that correct 
responders needed on average about a minute and 
a half to enter their response whereas incorrect 
responders only took about 30 seconds (Johnson 
et al., 2016). Although this fits with the claim 
that System 2 processing is slower than System 1 
processing, it does not necessarily imply that 
someone who engaged in System 2 reasoning, 
first engaged in System 1. That is, the fact that a 
correct response takes more time does not imply 
that correct responders generated the incorrect 
response before they considered the correct 
response. In theory, they might have needed more 
time to complete the System 2 computations 
without ever having considered the incorrect 
response. Hence, if we want to obtain solid 
evidence for the corrective assumption we need 
to move beyond mere latency data.  
 Somewhat more convincing evidence for 
the corrective dual process assumption in the bat-
and-ball problem comes from a recent paper by 
Travers et al. (2016). In the study Travers et al. 
adopted a mouse tracking paradigm. In this 
paradigm different response options are presented 
in each of the corners of the screen (e.g., “10 
cents”, “5 cents”) and participants have to move 
the mouse pointer from the center of the screen 
towards the response option of their choice to 
indicate their decision. This procedure can be 
used to study the time-course of decisions on the 
basis of participant’s mouse cursor trajectories 
(e.g., Spivey, Grosjean, & Knoblich, 2005). For 
example, do reasoners who ultimately select the 
correct response tend to move the mouse first 
towards the incorrect response? Travers et al. 
found that this was indeed the case. After about 
5s participants started to make initial movements 
towards the incorrect “10 cents” option. 
However, movements towards the correct 
response were not observed until about 5 s later. 
These findings present some support but they are 
not conclusive. Note that if a response is truly 
intuitive, one might expect it to be cued instantly 
upon reading the problem. In this sense, the 5 s 
time lag before participants started to make 
mouse movements in the Travers et al. study is 
still quite long. This leaves open the possibility 
that the procedure is not picking up on earlier 
intuitive processing (Travers et al., 2016).  
 In the present paper we report a research 
project involving a total of seven studies in which 
we aimed to test the corrective nature of correct 
responding in the bat-and-ball problem directly. 
In other words, we aim to test the role of effortful 
thinking in generating the correct “5 cents” 
response. We therefore adopted the two-response 
4 
 
paradigm (Thompson, Prowse Turner, & 
Pennycook, 2011). Thompson and colleagues 
developed this procedure to gain direct 
behavioral insight into the timing of intuitive and 
deliberative response generation. In the paradigm 
participants are presented with a reasoning 
problem and are instructed to respond as quickly 
as possible with the first, intuitive response that 
comes to mind. Subsequently, they are presented 
with the problem again, and they are given as 
much time as they want to think about it and give 
a final answer. Interestingly, a key observation 
for our present purposes was that Thompson and 
colleagues observed that people rarely change 
their initial response in the deliberation phase 
(Pennycook & Thompson, 2012; Thompson & 
Johnson, 2014; Thompson et al., 2011). This lack 
of answer change tentatively suggests that in 
those cases where a correct response was given 
as final response, the very same response was 
generated from the start. In other words, the 
correct response might have been generated fast 
and intuitively based on mere System 1 
processing (Pennycook & Thompson, 2012; 
Thompson & Johnson, 2014; see also Bago & De 
Neys, 2017, and Newman, Gibb, & Thompson, 
2017).   
 However, past two-response studies used 
problems which were typically considerably 
easier than the bat-and-ball problem (Travers et 
al., 2016). Note that the dual process model does 
not entail that correct responding requires System 
2 thinking in all possible situations and 
conditions. In some elementary tasks (e.g., 
Modus Ponens inferences in conditional 
reasoning, see Evans, 2010) the processing 
needed to arrive at the correct response might be 
so basic that it has been fully automatized and 
incorporated as a System 1 response. Likewise, in 
some cases System 1 might not generate a 
(incorrect) response and there will obviously be 
no need to correct it. Hence, findings pointing to 
correct intuitive responding might be attributed to 
the exceptional, non-representative nature of the 
task (Aczel, Szollosi, & Bago, 2016; Mata, 
Ferreira, Voss, & Kollei, 2017; Pennycook, 
Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012; Singmann, Klauer, 
& Kellen, 2014; Travers et al., 2016). Proponents 
of the corrective dual process view can still argue 
that in prototypical cases – with the bat-and-ball 
problem as paradigmatic example - correct 
responding can only occur after deliberation and 
correction of an intuitive response.  In addition, 
one might argue that at least in the initial two-
response studies participants were simply 
instructed - and not forced - to respond 
intuitively. Hence, participants might have failed 
to respect the instructions and ended up with a 
correct first response precisely because they 
engaged in System 2 processing. Clearly, one has 
to try to make maximally sure that only System 1 
is engaged at the initial response phase.  
 In the present study we adopt the two-
response paradigm in a reasoning task with items 
that are directly modeled after the bat-and-ball 
problem. We also use stringent procedures to 
guarantee that the first response is intuitive in 
nature. Participants are forced to give their first 
response within a challenging deadline (e.g., 4 s 
in Study 1, the time needed to simply read the 
problem as indicated by pretesting). In addition, 
during the initial response phase participants’ 
cognitive resources are also burdened with a 
secondary load task. The rationale is simple. 
System 2 processing, in contrast with System 1, 
is often conceived as time and resource 
demanding (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2005). By depriving participants from 
these resources we attempt to “knock” out 
System 2 as much as possible during the initial 
response phase (Bago & De Neys, 2017). In other 
words, by having participants reason under 
conditions that minimize possible deliberation in 
the initial response phase, we attempt to identify 
the presumed intuitive response that precedes the 
final response given after deliberation. Finally, 
we also use a range of procedures to eliminate 
possible confounds resulting from task familiarity 
or guessing.   
 To give away the punchline, our key 
result is that although we replicate the biased 
responding on the bat-and-ball problem, we also 
find consistent evidence for correct “intuitive” 
responding in the initial response phase. 
Whenever people manage to give the correct “5 
cent” answer as their final response after 
deliberation, they often already selected this 
answer as their initial response when possible 
deliberation was experimentally minimized. In 
the different studies we use various 
manipulations (response format variations, Study 
1-5; response justification elicitation, Study 6-7) 
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that help to pinpoint the nature of the intuitive 
(i.e., initial) correct responses and the contrast 
with deliberate correct responses after reflection. 
Based on our empirical findings we will argue 
that the role of System 1 and 2 in dual process 
theories might need to be re-conceptualized: In 
line with the “intuition-as-a-guide” view favored 
by Einstein and Poincaré, it seems that in 
addition to the correction of an incorrect 
intuition, deliberation is often also used to verify 
and justify a correct intuitive insight.   
 
 
Study 1 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
In Study 1, 101 Hungarian undergraduate 
students (87 female, Mean age = 19.8 years, SD 
= 1.5 years) from the Eotvos Lorand University 
of Budapest were tested. Only freshmen were 
allowed to participate, so their highest completed 
educational level was high school (except 1 
subject who reported that she already had a 
Bachelor degree). Participants received course 
credit for taking part. Participants in Study 1 (and 
all other reported studies) completed the study 
online.  
 
Materials 
Reasoning problems. In total, eight 
content modified version of the bat-and-ball 
problem were presented. The original bat-and-
ball problem is frequently featured in scientific 
studies and popular science writing which 
implies that prospective participants might be 
familiar with it (Haigh, 2016). Previous studies 
have shown that more experienced participants 
(who took part in more studies and thus had a 
higher likelihood to have previously seen or 
solved the bat-and-ball problem) performed 
significantly better than naïve participants 
(Stieger & Reips, 2016). Furthermore, Chandler, 
Mueller, and Paolacci (2014) have also found a 
positive correlation between the performance on 
the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, a short 3-
item questionnaire that includes the bat-and-ball 
problem) and the number of experiments people 
participated in. However, this correlation 
disappeared when the researchers used 
structurally identical, but content modified 
version of the problems.  We used similar content 
modified versions of the original bat-and-ball 
problem (e.g., problems stated that a cheese and a 
bread together cost 2.90 euro2 or that an apple 
and an orange together cost 1.80 euro) in the 
present study to minimize the effect of familiarity 
or prior exposure on task performance. 
Furthermore, we presented multiple 
items to help us test for a possible guessing 
confound. Study 1 adopted a binary response 
format (see further). Hence, mere guessing at the 
initial response stage would already result in 50% 
correct “intuitive” responses. However, by 
presenting multiple items and computing a 
measure of “stability” (i.e., out of the presented 
items, on how many did the participant respond 
similarly?) we can control for the guessing 
account. If System 1 computes the correct 
response one would expect that reasoners manage 
to select it consistently. If correct responding 
results from mere guessing, it should only by 
observed on about half of the presented items. 
Note that in theory presenting multiple items 
might also boost participants’ accuracy because 
of a learning or transfer effect: after having 
solved the problem once, participants might have 
learned to apply the same strategy on subsequent 
items. However, Chandler et al.’s (2016) work 
suggests that people’s knowledge about the 
problem is highly item and content specific. 
Hoover and Healy (2017) also failed to observe 
transfer effects with repeated presentation of 
(content modified) problems. Hence, by changing 
the content of every item we can expect to 
minimize learning effects.  
In Study 1 each problem was always 
presented with two answer options; the correct 
response (e.g., “5 cents” in the original bat-and-
ball problem) which is assumed to require 
System 2 deliberation and the “heuristic” 
response which is assumed to be cued by System 
1 (e.g., “10 cents” in the original problem). We 
will use the labels correct and “heuristic” 
response to refer to these answers options. 
Mathematically speaking, the correct equation to 
solve the bat-and-ball problem is: 100 + 2x = 
                                                             
2 Note that in all our studies with Hungarian subjects 
we used euro instead of dollar units since this currency 
is more familiar to them.  
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110, instead, people are thought to be intuitively 
using the “100 + x = 110” equation to determine 
their response (Kahneman, 2011). We always 
used the latter equation to determine the 
“heuristic” answer option, and the former to 
determine the correct answer option for each 
problem (e.g., if the two objects were said to cost 
2.30 in total, the presented heuristic response 
option was 30 cents and the presented correct 
response option was 15 cents).  
Participants had to indicate their answer 
by clicking on one of the options with the mouse. 
After providing an answer, they immediately 
advanced to the next problem. In order to 
minimize the influence of reading times and get a 
less noisy measure of reasoning time, problems 
were presented serially. First, the first sentence of 
the problem was presented, which always stated 
the two objects and their cost together (e.g., “An 
apple and an orange cost 1.80 euros in total”). 
Next, the rest of the problem was presented under 
the first sentence (which stayed on the screen), 
with the question and the possible answer 
options. The following illustrates the full problem 
format: 
 
An apple and an orange cost 1.80 euros in total.   
The apple costs 1 euro more than the orange. 
How much does the orange cost?  
o 40 cents 
o 80 cents 
 
 To further assure that possible correct (or 
incorrect) responses did not originate from 
guessing we also presented control problems (see 
De Neys, Rossi, & Houdé, 2013; Travers et al., 
2016). In the regular bat-and-ball problem the 
intuitively cued response is assumed to cue an 
answer that conflicts with the correct answer. In 
the “no-conflict” control problems, the conflict 
was removed. This was achieved by deleting the 
critical relational “more than” statement. With 
the above example, a control problem looked as 
follows: 
 
An apple and an orange cost 1.80 euros in total. 
The apple costs 1 euro. 
How much does the orange cost?  
o 40 cents 
o 80 cents 
 
In this case the intuitively cued “80 cents” 
answer was also correct. The second response 
option for the control problems was always the 
correct response divided by 2 (e.g., “40 cents” in 
the example). Half of the presented problems 
were regular “conflict” problems, half of them 
were control problems. If participants are not 
guessing, performance on the control problems 
should be at ceiling (e.g., De Neys et al., 2013). 
 Two problem sets were used in order to 
counterbalance the item content; the conflict 
items in one set were the control items in the 
other, and vice-versa.  Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the sets. This 
counterbalancing minimized the possibility that 
item contents would affect the contrast between 
conflict and control items. The presentation order 
of the items was randomized in both sets. All 
problems are presented in the Supplementary 
Material, section A.  
 
Load task. We wanted to try to make 
maximally sure that participants’ initial response 
was intuitive (i.e., System 2 engagement is 
minimized). Therefore, we used a cognitive load 
task (i.e., the dot memorization task, see Miyake, 
Friedman, Rettinger, Shah, & Hegarty, 2001) to 
burden participants’ cognitive resources  The 
rationale behind the load manipulation is simple; 
System 2 processing is often assumed to require 
executive cognitive resources, while it is assumed 
that System 1 processing does not require these 
resources (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
Consequently, if we burden someone’s executive 
resources while they are asked to solve reasoning 
problems, System 2 engagement is less likely. 
We opted for the dot memorization task because 
it is well-established that it  successfully burdens 
participant’s executive resources (De Neys & 
Schaeken, 2007; De Neys & Verschueren, 2006; 
Franssens & De Neys, 2009; Johnson, et al., 
2016; Miyake et al., 2001). Before each 
reasoning problem participants were presented 
with a 3 x 3 grid, in which 4 dots were placed. 
Participants were instructed that it was critical to 
memorize it even though it might be hard while 
solving the reasoning problem. After answering 
the reasoning problem participants were shown 
four different matrixes and they had to choose the 
correct, to-be-memorized pattern. They received 
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feedback as to whether they chose the correct or 
incorrect pattern. The load was only applied 
during the initial response stage and not during 
the subsequent final response stage in which 
participants were allowed to deliberate (see 
further).  
 
Procedure 
Reading pre-test. Before we ran the main 
study we also recruited an independent sample of 
64 participants for a pre-test in which participants 
were simply asked to read our reasoning task 
items and randomly click on a response option 
when they were ready. The idea was to base the 
response deadline in the main reasoning task on 
the average reading time in the reading test. Note 
that dual process theories are highly 
underspecified in many aspects (Kruglanski, 
2013); they argue that System 1 is faster than 
System 2, but do not further specify how fast 
System 1 is exactly (e.g., System 1 < x seconds). 
Hence, the theory gives us no unequivocal 
criterion on which we can base our deadline. Our 
“average reading time” criterion provides a 
practical solution to define the response deadline. 
If people are allotted the time they need to simply 
read the problem, we can assume that System 2 
engagement is minimal. Full procedural details 
are presented in the Supplementary Material, 
Section D. The average reading time of the 
sample was 3.87 s (SD = 2.18 s). To give 
participants some minimal leeway, we rounded 
the average reading time to the closest higher 
natural number and set the response deadline to 4 
seconds. 
 
Reasoning task. The experiment was run 
online. Participants were specifically instructed at 
the beginning that we were interested in their 
very first, initial answer that came to mind. They 
were also told that they would have additional 
time afterwards to reflect on the problem and 
could take as much time as they needed to 
provide a final answer. The literal instructions 
that were used, stated the following (translated 
from Hungarian): 
 
Welcome to the experiment! 
Please read these instructions carefully! 
 
This experiment is composed of 8 questions 
and a couple of practice questions. It will 
take about 10 minutes to complete and it 
demands your full attention. You can only 
do this experiment once. 
 
In this task we'll present you with a set of 
reasoning problems. We want to know what 
your initial, intuitive response to these 
problems is and how you respond after you 
have thought about the problem for some 
more time. Hence, as soon as the problem is 
presented, we will ask you to enter your 
initial response. We want you to respond 
with the very first answer that comes to 
mind. You don't need to think about it. Just 
give the first answer that intuitively comes 
to mind as quickly as possible. Next, the 
problem will be presented again and you 
can take all the time you want to actively 
reflect on it. Once you have made up your 
mind you enter your final response. You 
will have as much time as you need to 
indicate your second response. 
 
After you have entered your first and final 
answer we will also ask you to indicate 
your confidence in the correctness of your 
response. 
 
In sum, keep in mind that it is really crucial 
that you give your first, initial response as 
fast as possible. Afterwards, you can take as 
much time as you want to reflect on the 
problem and select your final response.  
  
You will receive 500 HUF for completing 
this experiment. 
 
Please confirm below that you read these 
instructions carefully and then press the 
"Next" button. 
 
After this general introduction, participants were 
presented with a task specific introduction which 
explained them the upcoming task and informed 
them about the response deadline. The literal 
instructions were as follows:  
 
We are going to start with a couple of 
practice problems. First, a fixation cross will 
appear. Then, the first sentence of the 
problem is going to be presented for 2 
seconds. Next, the rest of the problem will be 
presented.  
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As we told you we are interested in your 
initial, intuitive response. First, we want you 
to respond with the very first answer that 
comes to mind. You don't need to think about 
it. Just give the first answer that intuitively 
comes to mind as quickly as possible. To 
assure this, a time limit was set for the first 
response, which is going to be 4 seconds. 
When there is 1 second left, the background 
colour will turn to yellow to let you know 
that the deadline is approaching. Please make 
sure to answer before the deadline 
passes.  Next, the problem will be presented 
again and you can take all the time you want 
to actively reflect on it. Once you have made 
up your mind you enter your final response. 
 
After you made your choice and clicked on it, 
you will be automatically taken to the next 
page. 
After you have entered your first and final 
answer we will also ask you to indicate your 
confidence in the correctness of your 
response. 
Press "Next" if you are ready to start the 
practice session! 
 
 
After the specific instruction page 
participants solved two unrelated practice 
reasoning problems to familiarize them with the 
procedure. Next, they solved two practice dot 
matrix practice problems (without concurrent 
reasoning problem). Finally, at the end of the 
practice, they had to solve the two earlier practice 
reasoning problems under cognitive load. 
Each problem started with the 
presentation of a fixation cross for 1000 ms. 
After the fixation cross disappeared, the dot 
matrix appeared and stayed on the screen for 
2000 ms. Then the first sentence appeared alone 
for 2000 ms. Finally, the remaining part of the 
problem appeared (while the first sentence stayed 
on screen). At this point participants had 4000 ms 
to give an answer; after 3000 ms the background 
of the screen turned yellow to warn participants 
about the upcoming deadline.  If they did not 
provide an answer before the deadline, they were 
asked to pay attention to provide an answer 
within the deadline. The position of the correct 
answer alternative (i.e., first or second response 
option) was randomly determined for each item. 
After the initial response, participants 
were asked to enter their confidence in the 
correctness of their answer on a scale from 0% to 
100%, with the following question: “How 
confident are you in your answer? Please type a 
number from 0 (absolutely not confident) to 100 
(absolutely confident)”.  
After indicating their confidence, they 
were presented with four dot matrix options, 
from which they had to choose the correct, to-be-
memorized pattern. Once they provided their 
memorization answer, they received feedback as 
to whether it was correct. If the answer was not 
correct, they were also asked to pay more 
attention to memorizing the correct dot pattern on 
subsequent trials.  
 Finally, the same item was presented 
again, and participants were asked to provide a 
final response. Once they clicked on one of the 
answer options they were automatically advanced 
to the next page where they had to provide their 
confidence level again. 
The colour of the answer options was 
green during the first response, and blue during 
the final response phase, to visually remind 
participants which question they were answering. 
Therefore, right under the question we also 
presented a reminder sentence: “Please indicate 
your very first, intuitive answer!” and “Please 
give your final answer.”, respectively, which was 
also coloured as the answer options.  
At the very end of the experiment, 
participants were shown the standard bat-and-ball 
problem and were asked whether they had seen it 
before. We also asked them to enter the  solution. 
Finally, participants completed a page with 
demographic questions. 
 
 Exclusion criteria. In total, 26.7% (n = 
27) of participants reported they had seen the 
original bat-and-ball problem before. Thirteen 
participants in this group managed to give the 
correct “5 cents” response. Although we used 
content modified problem versions in our study, 
we wanted to completely eliminate the possibility 
that these participants’ prior knowledge of the 
original correct solution would affect the 
findings. Therefore, we decided to discard all 
data from the participants who had seen the 
original bat-and-ball problem before and knew 
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the correct solution (i.e., 13% from total sample, 
88 participants were further analyzed).  
The remaining participants failed to 
provide a first response before the deadline in 
10.3% of the trials. In addition, in 11.3% of the 
trials participants responded incorrectly to the dot 
memorization load task. All these trials were 
removed from the analysis because it cannot be 
guaranteed that the initial response resulted from 
mere System 1 processing: If participants took 
longer than the deadline, they might have 
engaged in deliberation. If they failed the load 
task, we cannot be sure that they tried to 
memorize the dot pattern and System 2 was 
successfully burdened. In these cases we cannot 
claim that possible correct responding at the 
initial response stage is intuitive in nature. Hence, 
removing trials that did not meet the inclusion 
criteria gives us the purest possible test of our 
hypothesis.  
In total, 18.3% of trials were excluded 
and 575 trials (out of 704) were further analyzed 
(initial and final response for the same item 
counted as 1 trial). For completeness, note that in 
Study 1 - and all other studies reported here - we 
also ran our analyses with all trials included. Key 
findings were never affected.   
 
Statistical analyses. Throughout the 
article we used mixed-effect regression models 
(Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008) in which 
participants and items were entered as random 
intercepts to analyse our results. For the binary 
choice data we used logistic regression while for 
the continuous confidence and reaction time data 
we used linear regression.  
 
Results 
 
 Table 1 gives an overview of the results. 
For consistency with previous work we first 
focus on the response accuracies for the final 
response. In line with the literature we find that 
most participants fail to solve the conflict 
versions of the bat-and-ball problem correctly. 
On average, final accuracy on the conflict items 
reached 24.5% (SD = 43.1). As one might expect, 
on the no-conflict control problems where 
System 1 processing is hypothesized to cue the 
correct response, final accuracy is at ceiling with 
about 96% (SD = 19.6) correct responses.  These 
final response accuracies are consistent with what 
can be expected based on previous work that 
adopted a classic one-response paradigm (e.g., 
21.6% and 97.4% in Johnson et al., 2016; 21% 
and 98% in De Neys et al., 2013). This indicates 
that the use of a two-response paradigm does not 
distort reasoning performance per se (Thompson 
et al., 2011).  
The initial response accuracies are more 
surprising. In about 20.1% (SD = 40.2%) of the 
conflict trials people already give the correct 
answer as their initial response. This suggests 
that participants can solve the bat-and-ball 
problem “intuitively". However, the raw 
percentage of correct intuitive responses is not 
fully informative. We can obtain a deeper insight 
into the results by performing a Direction of 
Change analysis on the conflict trials (Bago & De 
Neys, 2017).  This means that we look at the way 
a given person in a specific trial changed (or 
didn’t change) her initial answer after the 
deliberation phase. More specifically, people can 
give a correct or incorrect response in each of the 
two response stages. Hence, in theory this can 
result in four different types of answer change 
patterns (“00”, incorrect response in both stages; 
“11”, correct response in both stages; “01”, initial 
incorrect and final correct response; “10”, initial 
correct and final incorrect response). According 
to the standard dual process model, two types of 
direction of change should be most common; 00 
and 01. The “00” category implies that System 1 
processes generated an initial incorrect response 
and System 2 thinking did not manage to 
override it. Consequently, the person is biased. 
The “01” category presents the standard 
correction case; System 1 processing will 
generate an initial incorrect response, but System 
2 processing later manages to correct it in the 
final response stage.   
Table 2 summarizes the frequencies of 
each direction of change category for the conflict 
problems. The most prevalent category is the 00 
one; this pattern was generated in 71.8% of the 
trials. This means that both at the initial and final 
response stage participants were typically biased 
when solving our problems, which mirrors the 
overall accuracy pattern. One can also observe 
that there is a non-negligible amount of 01 
responses (8.1% of trials). This is in accordance 
with the dual process predictions. Some reasoners 
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initially generated the incorrect response, but 
managed to correct it after deliberation. 
However, the problem is that we observe about 
twice as many 11 cases (16.5% of trials). This 
means that in many cases (i.e., 67.2%) in which 
reasoners managed to give the correct response as 
their final answer, they already gave it 
“intuitively” at the initial response stage. We 
refer to this critical number [(i.e., 11/(11+01) 
ratio] as the % of non-corrective correct 
responses or non-correction rate in short. Overall, 
this result implies that contrary to the core dual 
process assumption, correct responding in the 
bat-and-ball problem does not necessarily require 
System 2 correction. System 2 correction does 
exist (i.e., we observe some 01 cases) but the 
point is that this correction seems to be far less 
common than assumed.  
For completeness, Table S3 in the 
Supplementary Material also gives an overview 
of the direction of change findings for the no-
conflict control items. Not surprisingly, here 
responses predominantly (93%) fell in the 11 
category.   
Clearly, a critic might argue that given 
our binary response format our correct initial 
responses on the conflict items result from mere 
guessing. Indeed, our task is quite challenging – 
people have to respond within a very strict 
deadline and under cognitive load. In theory, it is 
possible that participants found the task too hard 
and just randomly clicked on one of the presented 
solutions. However, the ceiled initial 
performance on the no-conflict control problems 
argues against a general guessing confound (i.e., 
93.4% vs 20.1% correct initial responses on the 
no-conflict and conflict problems respectively, χ2 
(1) = 56.64, p < 0.0001, b = -4.77). If our task 
was so challenging that participants had to guess 
because they were not even able to read the 
problem information, their performance on the 
conflict and no-conflict problems should not have 
differed and should have hovered around 50% in 
both cases. Further evidence against a guessing 
account is also provided by our stability analysis 
(see below).   
Our direction of change analysis was 
computed across items and participants. One 
might wonder whether participants are stable in 
their preference for one or the other type of 
change category. That is, does an individual who 
produces a correct (incorrect) initial response on 
one conflict problem does so consistently for the 
other items? To answer this question we 
calculated for every participant on how many 
conflict problems they displayed the same 
direction of change category. We refer to this 
measure as the stability index. For example, if an 
individual shows the same type of direction of 
change on all four conflict problems, the stability 
index would be 100%. If the same direction of 
change is only observed on two trials, the 
stability index would be 50% etc. Table 3 
presents an overview of the findings. Note that 
due to our methodological restrictions (discarding 
of answers after the deadline and for which the 
load memorization was not successful) for a 
small number of participants less than four 
responses were available. Here the stability index 
is calculated over the available items.  
As Table 3 shows, the dominant category 
is the 100% stability one. The average stability 
index on conflict items was 87.1% (SD = 20.5)3. 
This indicates that the type of change is highly 
stable at the individual level. If people show a 
specific direction of change pattern on one 
conflict problem, they tend to show it on all 
conflict problems. Note that the stability index 
directly argues against the guessing account. If 
people were guessing when giving their initial 
answer, they should not tend to pick the same 
response consistently.  Likewise, the high 
stability also argues against a possible practice or 
learning account. Although we used content-
modified items (i.e., each item mentioned a 
unique set of products and total dollar amount), 
one might argue that the repeated presentation of 
multiple problems helped participants to learn 
and automatize the calculation of the correct 
response. Correct intuitive responding would 
arise near the end of the study, but would not be 
observed at the start. However, pace the learning 
account, the high stability indicates that 
participants’ performance did not change across 
the study. If participants managed to give a 
correct initial answer at the end of the study, they 
already did so at the start. If they were biased at 
                                                             
3 Table S4 in the Supplementary Material shows that 
the stability was also high on the control problems 
with an average of 93% (SD = 12.8).  
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the start, they were so at the end. This directly 
argues against a learning account. 
   
Discussion 
 
Consistent with the prior literature, Study 
1 showed that people are typically biased and fail 
to solve the bat-and-ball problem. Considered in 
isolation, this fits with the standard dual process 
story that solving the problem is hard and 
requires deliberate System 2 processing to 
override an incorrect intuition. However, the key 
finding is that in those cases where people do 
manage to give a correct final response after 
deliberation, they often already selected this 
answer as their first, intuitive response. Even 
though we experimentally reduced the use of 
System 2 deliberation and forced people to 
respond in a mere 4 s, correct responders often 
also gave the correct answer as their initial 
response. In many cases correct responses were 
non-corrective in nature. In other words, this 
suggests that correct responders do not 
necessarily need to correct their intuition, their 
intuition is often already correct.  
The high non-correction rate directly 
argues against the dual process theory 
assumption concerning the corrective nature of 
System 2 processing. But obviously, the results 
are based on one single study.  In Study 2-5 we 
therefore tested the robustness of the findings. 
We examined whether we can replicate the 
pattern and whether it is robust to variations in 
response format. In Study 1 we used a binary 
forced-choice response format. In Study 2 and 3 
we also introduced a condition with a 4-option 
response format. In Study 4 and 5 we used a free-
response format. Each response format has some 
methodological advantages and disadvantages. 
The simple binary format allows us to set the 
most stringent deadline for the initial response 
stage. If people are presented with and have to 
read more response options or have to type their 
own response, they will need more time to enter a 
response. On the other hand, the multiple 
response and free response format allow better 
control against guessing and provide insight into 
the nature or specificity of the intuitive response. 
Clearly, if an individual selects a correct initial 
response in a binary choice format, this does not 
necessarily imply that she has calculated that the 
correct response is “5 cents”. She might have 
intuitively detected that the “10 cents” cannot be 
right (e.g., because the sum would be larger than 
$1.10) without knowing the correct solution. If 
participants select the “5 cents” response from a 
wider range of options – or generate it 
themselves – we can conclude that they also 
computed the correct response. In other words, 
we can test how precise their intuitive knowledge 
is. 
In Study 1 we tested Hungarian 
undergraduates. In Study 2-5, we also recruited 
participants from a wider range of populations 
(e.g., in terms of nationality, age, and education 
level).  
 
Study 2-5 
 
For ease of presentation we will present a single 
results section in which the response format 
factor is included as factor in the analyses. Here 
we present an overview of the method sections of 
Study 2-5.  
 
Method – Study 2: 2-option vs 4-option format 
(crowdsource sample) 
 
Participants   
A total of 372 participants were tested 
(196 female, Mean age = 39.6 years, SD = 13.5 
years). Participants were recruited on-line via the 
Crowdflower platform and received $0.20 for 
their participation. Only native English speakers 
from the USA or Canada were allowed to take 
part in the experiment. A total of 36% of the 
participants reported high school as highest 
completed educational level, while 62% reported 
having a post-secondary education degree (2% 
reported less than high school, and 1 participant 
did not provide this information).  
 
Materials and Procedure 
Reading pre-test. Half of the participants 
were presented with four response options in 
Study 2. Since reading through more options will 
in itself take more time, we decided to run a new 
reading pre-test with the 4-option format (see 
supplementary material, section D, for full 
details). The mean reading time in the pre-test 
sample was 4.3 s (SD = 2 s). As in Study 1, we 
rounded the deadline to the nearest higher natural 
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number. Hence, the time limit in the 4-option 
format was set to 5 s (vs 4 s in the 2-option 
format).   
 
Reasoning task. Participants were 
randomly allocated to the 2-option or 4-option 
treatment. The 2-option condition was 
completely identical to Study 1 except for the 
fact that material was presented in English and 
not in Hungarian. In the 4-options condition, two 
foil response options were presented in addition 
to the heuristic and correct response option. We 
used a “high” and a “low” foil option and used 
the following rules to determine them: the “high” 
foil was always the sum of the heuristic and 
correct options, whereas the “low” foil was 
always the greatest common divisor of the correct 
and heuristic option that was smaller than the 
correct answer. For example, in the original bat-
and-ball problem, these would be the four 
response options: 1 (low foil), 5 (correct), 10 
(heuristic), 15 (high foil). 
The presentation order of the response 
options was always the same in the initial and 
final response stages, but was counterbalanced 
across trials. All problems with their respective 
answer options are presented in the 
Supplementary Material, section A. 
 
 Exclusion criteria. The same exclusion 
criteria were applied as in Study 1. In total 15.3% 
of participants were excluded because they had 
seen the bat-and-ball problem before and knew 
the correct response. We further excluded all 
trials where participants failed to provide a 
response within the deadline (7.1% of trials; 7% 
in the 2-option and 7.3% in the 4-option 
condition) or did not provide the correct response 
to the load memorization task (13.3% of trials; 
14.9% in the 2-option and 11.5% in the 4-option 
condition). Altogether, 18.7% of trials were 
excluded and 2049 trials (out of 2520) were 
further analyzed. 
  
Method - Study 3: 2-option vs 4-option format 
(Hungarian student sample)  
 
Participants 
In total, 121 Hungarian university 
students from the Eotvos Lorand University of 
Budapest were tested (92 female, Mean age = 
22.2 years, SD = 1.4 years). Participants received 
500 HUF (~$1.7) for taking part. In total, 83% of 
subjects reported high school as highest 
educational level, and 17% reported that they 
already obtained a post-secondary educational 
degree.  
 
Materials and procedure 
We used Hungarian translations of the 
material but otherwise the Study 3 design was 
identical to Study 2. The same exclusion criteria 
were applied. In total 29.8% participants were 
excluded (85 were further analysed) because they 
had seen the original bat-and ball problem before 
and knew the correct answer. We further 
excluded trials where participants failed to 
provide a response within the deadline (9.4% of 
trials; 8.3% in the 2-option, and 10.5% in the 4-
option condition) or did not provide the correct 
response to the memorization load task (11.9% of 
trials; 11.9% in both the 2-option and 4-option 
condition). Altogether, 19.6% of trials were 
excluded and 547 trials (out of 680) were further 
analyzed. 
 
Method – Study 4: free response format 
(crowdsource sample)  
 
Participants 
A total of 47 participants took part (30 
female, Mean age = 43.8 years, SD = 15.2 years) 
in this study. Participants were recruited via 
Crowdflower and received $0.20 for completing 
the study. 32% of participants reported high 
school as highest completed educational level, 
and 66% reported having a post-secondary 
educational level degree (2% reported less then 
high school). 
 
Materials and procedure 
Study 4 used a free response format. 
Both in the initial and final response stage 
participants needed to click on a blank field 
where they had to enter their response, type their 
answer, and click on a button labelled “Next” to 
advance. Obviously, this procedure will take 
longer than simple response selection and will be 
affected by variance in typing skill. To avoid 
unwarranted response rejection we decided to set 
a liberal deadline of 10 s in the initial response 
stage. The problem background turned yellow 2 
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seconds before the deadline. Note that previous 
studies that adopted a free response format 
without time-restrictions reported average 
response latencies for correct answers of over 30 
s (Stupple et al., 2017; Johnson et al., 2016). 
Hence, by all means the 10 s deadline remains 
challenging. In addition, participants still had to 
give their initial response under secondary task 
load. Consequently, even with the longer 
deadline we still minimize System 2 engagement 
during the initial response stage. Otherwise, the 
study design was completely similar to Study 1.  
 The same exclusion criteria were applied 
as in Study 1. In total 14.9% participants were 
excluded because they had seen the original bat-
and-ball problem before and knew the correct 
response. We further excluded trials where 
participants failed to provide a response within 
the deadline (2.5% of trials) or did not provide 
the correct response to the memorization load 
task (12.8% of trials). Altogether, 14.4% of trials 
were excluded and 274 trials (out of 320) were 
further analyzed. 
 
Method – Study 5: free response format 
(Hungarian convenience sample)    
 
Participants 
A total of 55 Hungarian volunteers 
participated (50 female, Mean age = 33.8 years, 
SD = 9.3 years) in this study. Participants were 
recruited online through the help of social media. 
Participants completed the experiment online. 
33% of participants reported that their highest 
completed educational degree was high school, 
while 64% reported having a post-secondary 
educational level degree (4% reported less then 
high school). 
 
Materials and procedure 
 The same procedure was used as in Study 
4 but with a stricter initial response deadline of 8 
s. This was based on the fact that we observed 
that it took Study 4 participants on average only 
5.1 s (SD = 1.46 s) to enter their initial response. 
The problem background again turned yellow 2 
seconds before the deadline.  
 The same exclusion criteria were applied 
as in Study 1. In total 18.2% of participants were 
excluded because they had seen the original bat-
and-ball problem before and knew the correct 
response. We further excluded trials where 
participants failed to provide a response within 
the deadline (11.1% of trials) or did not provide 
the correct response to the memorization load 
task (11.7% of trials). Altogether, 19.7% of trials 
were excluded and 289 trials (out of 360) were 
further analyzed. 
 
Results  
 
 Table 1 and 2 give an overview of the 
accuracy and direction of change findings in each 
study.  The bottom rows of the tables show the 
overall average and the average in function of the 
three response formats we used across Study 1-5. 
The overall average sketches a pattern that is 
consistent with the Study 1 findings. Most people 
are biased when solving the conflict bat-and-ball 
problems with initial and final accuracies of 
13.8% and 16.8% whereas performance on the 
control no-conflict versions is at ceiling. 
Direction of change results for the conflict 
problems show that there is some correction 
going on with 5.2% of “01” cases in which an 
initial incorrect response is corrected after 
deliberation in the final response stage. However, 
the key finding is that the “11” cases in which a 
correct final response is preceded by a correct 
initial response are twice as likely (10.9%). 
Indeed, the overall non-correction rate reached 
67.6% - which is virtually identical to the 67.2% 
rate observed in Study 1. When eyeballing the 
averages for the three response formats 
separately, it is clear that by and large this overall 
pattern is observed with each format. There is no 
evidence for a systematic decrease in initially 
correct responding in the 4-option and free 
response studies. Statistical analyses showed that 
the initial accuracy, χ2 (2) = 1.11, p = 0.57, final 
accuracy, χ2 (2) = 0.67, p = 0.72, as well as the 
rate of non-corrective correct responding, χ2 (2) = 
4.2, p = 0.12, were not significantly affected by 
the response format. This implies that our core 
finding is robust: Across multiple studies with 
different response formats (and a range of 
populations) we consistently observe that when 
reasoners solve the bat-and-ball problem 
correctly, they typically give the same answer as 
their first, intuitive response. This questions the 
assumption that System 2 is needed to correct our 
intuition.  
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 As a side note, an intriguing 
observation is that when looking at the individual 
studies, one might note that in the two studies 
with participants recruited on the Crowdflower 
platform (Study 2: 2-option and 4-option formats 
and Study 4: free response format) we observed 
overall lower accuracies than in the other studies, 
both at the initial and final response stage. This 
trend reached significance at the initial, χ2 (1) = 
7.1, p = 0.008, b = 1.44, and at the final response 
stage, χ2 (1) = 4.35, p = 0.04, b = 1.5, as well. 
Nevertheless, despite the overall lower accuracy 
we observe the same key pattern. The non-
correction rate did not differ significantly in our 
Crowdflower studies and the other studies, χ2 (1) 
= 1.63, p = 0.20. 
 Table 3 gives an overview of the 
stability index on the conflict items in Study 2-5. 
As in Study 1 we observe that the index is 
consistently high with an overall average value of 
91.3%. This indicates that the direction of change 
pattern is highly stable at the individual level. If 
people show a specific direction of change 
pattern on one conflict problem, they show this 
same pattern on all conflict problems. This 
argues against a guessing and practice account. If 
participants gave correct intuitive responses 
because they guessed or because the repeated 
presentation allowed them to automatize the 
calculations after the first trial(s), their 
performance should have shown more 
variability4. Nevertheless, there was some 
variability and especially with respect to the 
practice account one might argue that it can be 
informative to focus exclusively on the very first 
problem that reasoners solved. In an additional 
analysis we therefore included only the first 
conflict problem that reasoners solved and 
excluded all later trials. Obviously, given that we 
restrict the analysis to a single trial with only a 
small number of critical correct (initial and final) 
                                                             
4 We also looked specifically at the “stability” for the 
11 responses (i.e., average % of 11 trials among 
people with at least one 11 trial). This confirmed the 
overall stability findings with an average across study 
1-5 of 66.3%. Stability was slightly lower for the 
binary 2-response option studies but even here it 
differed significantly from chance, t(45) = -1427, p < 
.0001, further arguing against a guessing account. See 
Table S10 for an overview.   
responses per study, it should not be surprising 
that the data are noisier. Nevertheless, key 
finding is that even in this single trial analysis, 
the overall non-correction rate across our studies 
still reached 42% (individual experiments range 
from 11% to 75%; average 2-response format = 
30.1%, average 4-response = 61.5%, average free 
response = 40%, see supplementary Table S7 for 
a full overview). Although the effect is less 
robust than in the full analysis, this confirms that 
the critical correct initial responding is present 
from the start. 
 Having established that the core finding 
concerning the generation of a correct System 1 
intuition is robust, we can dig somewhat deeper 
into the findings.  One interesting open question 
is whether correct initial responders are faced 
with two competing intuitions at the first 
response stage. That is, a possible reason for why 
people in the 11 category manage to give a 
correct initial response might be that the problem 
simply does not generate an intuitive heuristic 
“10 cents” response for them. Hence, they would 
only generate a correct “5 cents” intuition and 
would not be faced with an interfering heuristic 
one. Alternatively, they might generate two 
competing intuitions, but the correct intuition 
might be stronger and therefore dominate (Bago 
& De Neys, 2017).  
We can address this question by looking 
at the contrast between conflict and no-conflict 
control problems. If conflict problems cue two 
conflicting initial intuitive responses, people 
should process the problems differently than the 
no-conflict problems (in which such conflict is 
absent) in the initial response stage. Studies on 
conflict detection during reasoning that used a 
classic single response paradigm have shown that 
processing conflict problems typically results in 
lower confidence and longer response latencies 
(e.g., Botvinick, 2007; De Neys, 2012; 
Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015). The 
question that we want to answer here is whether 
this is also the case at the initial response stage. 
Therefore, we contrasted the confidence ratings 
and response times for the initial response on the 
conflict problems with those for the initial 
response on the no-conflict problems. Our central 
interest here concerns the 11 cases but a full 
analysis and discussion for each direction of 
change category is presented in the 
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Supplementary Material, section B. In sum, 
results across our five studies indeed show that 
11 responders showed both longer latencies 
(average increase = 720 ms, SD =113.8 ms, χ2 (1) 
= 21.7, p < 0.0001, b = 0.05) and decreased 
confidence (average decrease = 12.3 points, SD = 
1.9 points, χ2 (1) = 43.6, p < 0.0001, b = -12.2) on 
the conflict vs no-conflict problems. This 
supports the hypothesis that in addition to the 
dominant correct intuition the opposing heuristic 
“10 cents” is also being cued. In other words, 
System 1 seems to be generating two conflicting 
intuitions – a logical correct and incorrect 
heuristic one - in which one is stronger than the 
other and gets automatically selected as initial 
response without System 2 deliberation.   
Finally, one might also want to contrast 
the confidence ratings for the different direction 
of change categories. Previous two-response 
studies (e.g., Bago & De Neys, 2017; Thompson 
et al., 2011; Thompson & Johnson, 2014) 
established that the initial response confidence 
was lower for responses that got subsequently 
changed after deliberation (i.e., the “01” and “10” 
types) than for responses that were not changed 
(i.e., the “00” and “11” types). It has been 
suggested that this lower initial confidence (or 
“Feeling of Rightness” as Thompson et al. refer 
to it) would be one factor that determines 
whether reasoners will engage in System 2 
deliberation (e.g., Thompson et al., 2011). We 
therefore looked at the average confidence 
ratings across Study 1-5. To test the confidence 
trends, we entered direction of change category 
and/or response stage (initial or final) as fixed 
factors in our model (with, as in all our analyses, 
participants and items as random intercepts). 
Figure S1 in the supplementary material shows 
that the pattern reported by Thompson et al. 
(2011) is replicated in the current study: The 
initial response confidence for the “01” and “10” 
categories in which people change their initial 
response is lower than for responses that are not 
changed, χ2 (1) = 193.9, p < 0.0001, b = -27.2. A 
similar but less pronounced pattern is observed in 
the final response stage, χ2 (1) = 39, p < 0.0001, b 
= -8.9. When contrasting the initial and final 
confidence we also observe that after deliberation 
there is an overall trend towards increased 
confidence in the final response stage, χ2 (1) = 
91.6, p < 0.0001, b = 5.3 (e.g., Shynkaruk & 
Thompson, 2006; Thompson et al., 2011).  
  
Discussion 
 
 Study 2-5 replicated the key finding of 
our first study. Reasoners who manage to solve 
the bat-and-ball problem after deliberation often 
already solved it correctly from the start. This 
argues against the corrective nature of System 2 
deliberation. But this obviously raises a new 
question. If we don’t necessarily need System 2 
deliberation to correct our initial intuition, then 
what do we use or need it for? Why would 
correct responders ever deliberate, if their 
intuition already provides them with the correct 
answer? Here it is important to stress that the fact 
that people can intuitively generate the correct 
response, does not imply that the intuitive 
response will have the exact same characteristics 
as correct responses that are given after proper 
deliberation. Even if we accept that System 1 and 
System 2 might both generate a correct response, 
the processing characteristics will presumably 
differ. In other words, there should be some 
boundary conditions as to what reasoners can do 
on the basis of mere System 1 processing. Study 
6 and 7 focus on this issue.  
 One of the features that is often 
associated with System 2 deliberation is that it is 
cognitively transparent (Bonnefon, 2016; Evans 
& Stanovich, 2013). That is, the output comes 
“with an awareness of how it was derived” 
(Bonnefon, 2013). Intuitive processing lacks this 
explanatory property. Indeed, it is precisely the 
absence of such processing insight or justification 
that is often conceived as a defining property of 
intuitive processing - and one of the reasons to 
label intuitions as “gut-feelings” (Marewski & 
Hoffrage, 2015; Mega & Volz, 2014). Bluntly 
put, this suggest that people might intuitively 
know and generate a correct answer, but they will 
not know why it is correct. In Study 6 and 7 we 
tested this hypothesis by looking at people’s 
response justifications after the initial and final 
response stage. We hypothesised that although 
intuitive processes might suffice to estimate the 
correct answer and produce a correct initial 
response, people should have little insight into 
this process and fail to justify why their answer is 
correct. However, after deliberation in the second 
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response stage, such proper response justification 
should become much more likely. 
 
Study 6  
Methods 
 
Participants 
We recruited 63 Hungarian university 
students from the Eotvos Lorand University of 
Budapest (48 female, Mean age = 22.7 years, SD 
= 1.9 years). These participants received course 
credit for taking part. In total, 79% of participants 
reported high school as their highest completed 
educational level, 21% reported that they already 
had a post-secondary educational level degree. 
  
Materials and procedure 
Since the primary goal of Study 6 (and 7) 
was to study participant’s response justification 
we made a number of procedural changes to 
optimize the justification elicitation. Given that 
explicit justification might be hard (and/or 
frustrating) we opted to present only half of the 
Study 1 problems (i.e., two conflict and two no-
conflict versions). These items were chosen 
randomly from the Study 1 problems. Problem 
content was counterbalanced as in Study 1 and 
we also used the binary 2-option response format. 
The procedure followed the same basic two-
response paradigm as in Study 1 with the 
exception that cognitive load was not applied and 
participants were not requested to enter their 
response confidence so as to further simplify the 
task design. The same response deadline as in 
Study 1 (4 s) was maintained. Note that previous 
work from our team that contrasted deadline and 
load treatments indicated that a challenging 
response deadline may suffice to minimize 
System 2 engagement in a two-response 
paradigm (see Bago & De Neys, 2017). After 
both the initial and final response people were 
asked the following justification question: “Could 
you please try to explain why you selected this 
answer? Can you briefly justify why you believe 
it is correct? Please type down 
your justification below.” There was no time 
restriction to enter the justification. Whenever 
participants missed the response deadline for the 
reasoning problem, they were not presented with 
the justification question, but rather a message 
which urged them to make sure to enter their 
response before the deadline on the next item.   
  Justification analysis. To analyse 
participants’ justification we defined 8 main 
justification categories on the basis of an initial 
screening. Two independent raters categorized 
the justification responses into these categories. 
They were in agreement in 86.1% (378 out of 
439) of the cases. Cases in which the individual 
raters did not agree, were afterwards discussed 
among them with the goal of reaching an 
agreement (which was reached in all cases). 
Although our key interest lies in the rate of 
correct justification, the categorization gives us 
some insight into the variety of justifications 
participants spontaneously produce. The eight 
justification categories along with illustrative 
examples are presented below. Note that for 
illustrative purposes we have rephrased the 
examples into the original bat-and-ball problem 
units: 
 
Correct math. People referred to the correct 
mathematical solution (e.g., “because they cost 
1.10 together, and the ball costs 1 more than the 
ball, the ball will be 5 cents and the bat 1.05”, “5 
cents + 1.05 = 1.10”, “110 = x + 100x, 10 = 2x, x 
= 5”, “if the bat is 105 cents and the ball is 5 
cents then the bat will be 100 more”).  
Incorrect math. Participants referred to some sort 
of mathematical solution but it was not correct 
(e.g., “1.10 total, so it’s got to be 10 cents”, “1.10 
minus 1 is 10 cents”, “because I subtract the 
given price from the total price, then the rest will 
be the price of the good in question”, “1.10 – 1 = 
10”) 5. 
Unspecified math. Participants referred to 
mathematical calculation but did not specify the 
calculation (e.g., “I just did the math”, “mental 
calculation”, “this is how the solution comes out 
with mathematical calculations”; “result of my 
calculation”). 
Hunch. People referred to their gut feeling or 
intuition (e.g., “this is what seemed best, in the 
                                                             
5 To avoid confusion, note that for the no-conflict 
control trials, references to the mathematical solution 
“1.10 - .10 = 1” (i.e., an incorrect math justification on 
the conflict problems) were obviously scored as 
correct justifications.   
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moment of the decision”, “this was more 
sympathetic”, “I saw the numbers and based my 
decision on my intuition”, “this automatically 
came to me as soon as I saw the problem”).  
Guess. Participants referred to guessing. (e.g., “I 
guessed”, “I could not read it because it was so 
fast, just clicked on something”, “I couldn’t 
really think about the correct solution so I 
guessed”, “was my best guess”). 
Previous. Participants referred to previous 
answer without specifying it (e.g., “the 
justification is the same as before”, “my way of 
thinking is similar to the one I used in the 
previous task”, “I applied same logic as before”, 
“see before”). 
Other. Any justification that did not fit in other 
categories (e.g., “I was not sure because I do not 
have enough time to think it through”, “ I cannot 
think and read at the same time”, “Hard to tell”, “ 
Cannot justify it because I had to answer so 
quickly that I already forgot”).  
 
 Exclusion criteria. The same exclusion 
criteria as in Study 1 were applied: 17.5% of 
participants were excluded because they had seen 
the original bat-and-ball problem before and 
knew the correct response. We further excluded 
trials where participants failed to provide a 
response within the deadline (13% of trials). 
Altogether, 181 trials (out of 208) were further 
analyzed. 
 
Results and discussion 
The accuracy and direction of change 
pattern in Study 6 was consistent with the pattern 
we observed in Study 1-5: People typically fail to 
solve the bat-and-ball problem (37.8% final 
conflict accuracy), but among correct responders 
the correct response is frequently generated as 
initial response (non-correction rate of 59%, see 
Table 4 and 5 for full details). But clearly, the 
focus in Study 6 concerns the justifications. We 
are primarily interested in the proportion of 
correct justifications for correct conflict 
responses: In those cases that participants 
manage to respond correctly, could they also 
properly justify why their answer was correct? 
Correct justifications were defined as any 
minimal  reference to the correct mathematical 
solution (e.g., “because they cost 1.10 together, 
and the ball costs 1 more, the ball must be 5 cents 
and the bat 1.05”, “5 cents + 1.05 = 1.10”, “110 = 
bat + ball, bat = ball + 100, so ball = 10/2). In 
these cases we can be sure that participants have 
some minimal insight into the nature of the 
correct solution. Table 6 gives an overview of our 
justification classification for the critical conflict 
problems (see Supplementary Material Table S5 
for the no-conflict problems and Table S9 for the 
conflict justifications for the individual direction 
of change categories). The key finding is that 
correct justifications were indeed much more 
likely after deliberation than after intuitive 
responding. Correct justifications on the conflict 
problems tripled from 20.7% for initial correct 
responses to 60.6% for final correct responses, χ2 
(1) = 12.4, p < 0.001, b = -2.9. This presents 
some initial support for a boundary condition of 
correct System 1 responding. Although correct 
responders might generate the correct solution 
intuitively, they typically only manage to justify 
it after deliberation.  
 However, one might note that our open 
justification was quite noisy. There were certain 
types of justifications that were hard to interpret. 
For example, in the “Unspecified math” category 
we grouped answers in which participants 
indicated they “calculated” the response but did 
not explain how (e.g., “I did the math”). These 
were most common when participants gave an 
incorrect response (29% of incorrect cases), but 
were also observed for correct response (3% of 
correct cases). Clearly, it is possible that people 
knew the correct justification, but simply felt 
there was no need to specify or clarify it. 
Similarly, participants sometimes also wrote they 
did “what they did before” (i.e., “Previous” 
category, 13% of correct responses). Here too it 
is possible that people could justify the correct 
solution but did not bother to specify it. To 
sidestep such interpretational complications, we 
used a more structured justification elicitation in 
Study 7. A number of additional methodological 
improvements also allowed us to further validate 
the findings.     
 
Study 7 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
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A total of 128 Hungarian undergraduates 
from the Eotvos Lorand University of Budapest 
were tested (103 female, Mean age = 20.3 years, 
SD = 1.9 years). Participants received course 
credit for taking part. 87.5% of participants 
reported that their highest completed educational 
level was high school, and 12.5% reported they 
already had a post-secondary educational level 
degree.  
 
Materials and procedure 
The procedure was based on Study 6 
with several methodological changes. The main 
difference concerned the justification elicitation. 
To reduce interpretation noise we adopted a 
semi-structured justification format with four pre-
defined answer options that were based on the 
most frequent justification responses in Study 6. 
The following illustrates the lay-out: 
 
Could you please justify, why do you think 
that this is the correct response to the 
question? Please choose from the presented 
options below: 
 
° “I did the math. Please specify how: ____” 
° “I guessed”  
° “I decided based on intuition/gut feeling” 
° “Other, please specify: ____”  
 
For the first and fourth answer options 
participants were also asked to specify their 
answer. Our rationale was that this format should 
clarify that we expected them to enter a 
specification and thereby minimize mere 
unspecified references to “math/calculations” or 
“same as before” type responses. 
  As in Study 6, participants were 
presented with 2 conflict and 2 no-conflict 
problems. In Study 7 we adopted further 
modified content adopted from Trouche (2016; 
see also Mata et al., 2017). Problems had the 
same structure as the original bat-and-ball and 
our Study 6 items but instead of listing the price 
of two goods, they referred to a different unit 
(e.g., weight). This should further reduce any 
possible familiarity effect. Here is an example:  
 
An apple and an orange weigh 160 grams 
together. The apple weighs 100 grams more 
than the orange. How much does the orange 
weigh?”.  
° 60 grams  
° 30 grams 
 
 As in our other studies, two problem sets 
were used in order to counter-balance item 
content; the conflict items in one set were the 
control items in the other, and vice-versa.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
sets. A full overview of all problems can be 
found in the Supplementary Material (section A).   
In Study 6 we used the binary, 2-option 
response format for the reasoning problems. In 
Study 7 we used both a 2-option and free-
response format. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the treatments. The 2-response 
design was identical to Study 6. The response 
deadline in the 2-option condition was again 4 s. 
In the free response condition the deadline was 
set at 7 s.   
In Study 7 we also recorded the time it 
took for participants to enter their justification. 
Note that although correct justifications were 
much more likely after the final response in 
Study 6, there were still about 20% correct 
justifications for the initial response on our 
conflict bat-and-ball problems. One possibility is 
that some participants used the initial justification 
stage to start deliberating about their answer. If 
this is the case, one might expect that the 
justification response times for correct initial 
justifications will be affected. The justification 
latency results in Study 7 lend some support to 
this hypothesis. Although there were only a 
handful of correct initial justifications (n = 6), 
these did tend to take considerably longer (mean 
= 33.4 s, SD = 2.9 s) than when participants 
entered an incorrect initial math justification 
(mean = 17.7, SD = 2.04 s, χ2 (1) = 3.01, p = 
0.08) or a correct initial math justification on no-
conflict problems (mean = 17.87 s, SD = 2.9 s, 
χ2 (1) = 4.6, p = 0.032, b = 0.25). This suggests 
that some caution might be needed when 
interpreting the few correct initial response 
justifications.  
 As an additional manipulation check we 
also included a bogus test question at the end of 
the survey in Study 7 (Meade & Craig, 2012). 
Participants might not answer truthfully to our 
familiarity check (“Have you seen this problem 
before?”) because they feel it is undesirable to 
answer affirmatively (e.g., because of fears of 
19 
 
being screened out of the study, Wyse, 2013). We 
included the bogus question “Have you ever lied 
in your life?” to identify such a possible 
tendency. However, all participants passed this 
check question and answered affirmative.   
  
 Exclusion criteria. The same exclusion 
criteria as in our other studies were applied. 
17.2% of participants were excluded because 
they had seen the original bat-and-ball problem 
before and knew the correct response. We further 
excluded trials where participants failed to 
provide a response within the deadline (18.5% of 
trials in the 2-option condition; 12.9% of trials in 
the free response condition). Altogether, 15.6% 
of trials were excluded and 358 trials (out of 424) 
were further analyzed. 
  
Results and discussion 
 
 Accuracy and direction of change 
findings for the 2-option and free response 
condition in Study 7 can be found in Table 4 and 
5. As the tables show, results for the 2-option 
condition are perfectly in line with the 2-option 
findings in Study 6 and our other studies: In the 
vast majority of cases people fail to solve the 
conflict versions of the bat-and-ball problem, but 
those who do solve it correctly, often already do 
so in the initial response phase. The non-
correction rate in the 2-option condition reached 
62%. However, the pattern in the free response 
format clearly diverged. Final accuracy reached 
48.9% here; the highest rate we observed in any 
of our studies. The direction of change analysis 
indicates that this was driven by an extremely 
high rate of “01” responses (34%) in which the 
correct response was generated after deliberation. 
This differed significantly from the 2-option 
condition rate, χ2 (1) = 9.1, p = 0.002, b = 1.48. 
However, the “11” response rate (i.e., correct 
final responses that are preceded by a correct 
initial response) did not differ from the 2-option 
condition, χ2 (1) = 0.12, p = 0.72, b = -0.486, and 
was in line with what we observed previously. 
What this suggests is that participants in the free 
response justification condition showed higher 
accuracy, not because it was easier to solve the 
                                                             
6 The random effect of items was left out of the model 
because of  convergence problems. 
problem intuitively but because it was easier to 
arrive at the correct response after deliberation. It 
seems that the combination of being asked to 
generate your own response and having to justify 
it boosted deliberation. This boosted deliberation 
resulted in a non-correction rate of 30%, which is 
the lowest we observed in any of our studies7.  
 Although the positive impact on 
deliberation is interesting in its own right it does 
not impact our main justification goal. The key 
question remains to what extent people can 
justify their correct initial and final responses: In 
those cases that participants manage to respond 
correctly, could they also properly justify why 
their answer was correct? Table 7 shows the 
justification results for the conflict problems. We 
replicate the main finding of Study 6. Both in the 
2-option, χ2 (1) = 54.5, p < 0.0001, b = -64.6, and 
free response format condition, χ2 (1) = 22.3, p < 
0.0001, b = -3.3, correct justifications are much 
more likely for correct final than for correct 
initial responses. With the structured justification 
elicitation in Study 7 we obtained correct 
justification in over 90% of final correct 
responses (2-option: 96.2%; free response: 
90.7%). This directly establishes that whenever 
people give a correct response after deliberation, 
they have little trouble to justify it. However, 
such justification is much rarer for correct initial 
responses (2-option: 9.1%; free response: 
26.7%). A closer look at Table 7 shows that the 
dominant justifications for correct initial 
responses were references to intuition and 
guessing. These types of justifications were 
completely absent for correct final responses. 
Taken together, the results of our justification 
studies provide clear evidence for a boundary 
condition of correct System 1 intuitions. We can 
estimate the correct answer intuitively, but we 
don’t know how we do it. Our System 1 
                                                             
7 For completeness, we also looked at response 
accuracy on the first conflict problem in our 
justification studies. Across studies 6 and 7 the non-
correction rate was 33.3% (individual studies range 
from 23.3% to 60% non-correction; average 2-
response format = 43.3%, free response = 23.3%, see 
supplementary Table S8). Although these data concern 
a limited number of observations they further indicate 
that correct intuitive responding is observed from the 
start of the experiment, as we observed in Study 1-5.  
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knowledge is not cognitively transparent 
(Bonnefon, 2016). 
 
General Discussion 
 
 Influential work in the reasoning and 
decision making field since the 1960s has 
popularized a corrective view of human 
reasoning (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 
2011). This view entails that sound thinking in 
reasoning tasks such as the bat-and-ball problem 
often requires correction of fast, intuitive thought 
processes by slower and more demanding 
deliberation. The present study questions this 
idea. We focused on the very problem that has 
been widely featured as the paradigmatic 
illustration of the corrective view, the bat-and-
ball problem (e.g., Frederick, 2005; Kahneman, 
2011). By adopting a two response paradigm in 
which people were required to give an initial 
response under time-pressure and cognitive load 
we aimed to identify the intuitively generated 
response that preceded the final response given 
after deliberation. Across our studies we 
consistently observed that correct final responses 
are often non-corrective in nature. In a substantial 
number of cases, reasoners who manage to 
answer the bat-and-ball problem correctly after 
deliberation already solved it correctly when they 
reasoned under conditions that force reliance on 
intuition in the initial response phase. In other 
words, people who solve the bat-and-ball 
problem do not necessarily need to deliberate to 
correct their intuitions, their intuitions are often 
already correct.  
 These findings point to at least two 
fundamental implications about the way we 
conceive intuitive and deliberate thinking or 
System 1 and 2. On one hand, it suggests that we 
might need to upgrade our view of the intuitive 
System 1. Although System 1 can frequently cue 
incorrect intuitions, it also generates correct 
intuitions. Among correct responders it are these 
correct intuitions that will often dominate. 
Consequently, even when we’re faced with the 
notorious bat-and-ball problem, intuitive thinking 
is less ignorant or “smarter” than traditionally 
assumed. On the other hand, the upgrading of 
System 1 also suggests we need to revise the role 
of System 2. When the correct response can be 
generated intuitively, the central role of System 2 
deliberation cannot exclusively lie in a correction 
process. The results of our justification studies 
suggest that instead of in correction, the 
contribution of deliberate processing in these 
cases might rather lie in its cognitive 
transparency (Bonnefon, 2016). We observed that 
whereas people don’t manage to explain why 
their initial response is correct, they seem to have 
little difficulties in providing such correct 
justifications after deliberation. Clearly, being 
able to produce a proper justification for one’s 
insights is quite crucial. This was well-
understood by the leading scientists we cited to 
illustrate the “intuition-as-a-guide” view: 
Although Einstein and Poincaré wanted to 
highlight the key role of intuitive processes, they 
also stressed the importance of subsequent 
deliberation. Bluntly put, Kukulé and Newton 
would not have managed to convince their peers, 
if they had simply claimed their ideas were 
correct because they “felt it”. Hence, even among 
the historical proponents of the key role of 
intuitive thinking for sound reasoning there was 
never any question that intuitive insight will need 
further reflection and validation to be fully 
developed. In other words, the initial intuitive 
insight is important but does not suffice. What 
the present study suggests is that this view on 
intuitive reasoning in which deliberation is 
helping to validate an initial intuitive insight 
might be a more appropriate model to conceive 
of human reasoning than a view in which the key 
function of deliberation merely lies in correction 
of erroneous intuitions.  
 In recent years there have been a number 
of popular accounts that have celebrated the 
advantages of intuitive thinking over deliberate 
thinking (Dijksterhuis, 2011; Gigerenzer, 2007; 
Gladwell, 2005). Against this backdrop it should 
be stressed that our call to upgrade the role of 
System 1 and our arguments against the mere 
corrective view of System 2 should not be 
conceived as a claim to downgrade the 
importance of System 2 deliberation. First, across 
all our studies there were always instances in 
which System 2 correction did occur (i.e. “01” 
cases). Hence, the prototypical corrective pattern 
in which an initially faulty intuition is corrected 
after deliberation is also observed. Second, as we 
alluded to above, the fact that deliberation does 
not necessarily play a role in correction does not 
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imply it is not important for other reasons. Our 
findings suggest that one such reason might be its 
cognitive transparency and the fact that after 
deliberation people are able to come up with a 
proper justification. Hence, deliberation can help 
to produce a good explanation or argument for 
why a response is correct. Such arguments are 
critical for communicative purposes (e.g., 
Mercier & Sperber, 2011). What is true for 
scientific discussions is also true for daily life: 
we will not be very successful in convincing 
others that our answer to a problem is correct, if 
we can only tell them that we feel it is right.  If 
we come up with a good explanation, however, 
people will be much more likely to change their 
mind (Trouche, Sander, & Mercier, 2014). Such 
argumentative persuasion has been argued to be 
the evolutionary driving force behind the 
development of the human capacity to reason 
(Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Indeed, the human 
success as a social and cultural species is hard to 
imagine without an ability to communicate and 
transmit good problem solutions8. Hence, it 
would be foolish to interpret our findings and 
arguments against the corrective view of 
deliberation or System 2 as evidence against the 
role of deliberation in thinking per se.    
 In addition, one needs to bear in mind 
that although our findings present evidence for 
the possible non-corrective nature of correct 
responding, most people are still biased and fail 
to give the correct answer when solving the bat-
and-ball problem. In absolute numbers, incorrect 
“10 cents” responses are still much more 
common than correct “5 cents” responses. 
Solving the bat-and-ball problem correctly is still 
exceptional. The key issue is that in those cases it 
does occur, the correct response is often already 
generated intuitively. But in absolute terms such 
                                                             
8 Clearly, deliberation might have further additional 
benefits beyond communication per se. For example, 
another value of deliberate explanation might lie in the 
improvement of one’s own understanding which can 
facilitate knowledge transfer to other relevant 
problems (e.g., Wertheimer, 1945). Obviously, this 
does not preclude – as our justification data shows - 
that deliberation can also be used to generate incorrect 
justifications for incorrect responses, a process often 
referred to as “rationalization” (e.g., Wason & Evans, 
1975; Pennycook et al., 2015). Our claim here 
concerns the reasoning of correct responders. 
correct intuitive response generation remains 
rare. Obviously, the point is not that System 1 is 
always correct, the point is that it can be correct 
and is often already so for reasoners who respond 
correctly after having deliberated. 
 Likewise, our findings should not be 
taken to imply that System 2 deliberation cannot 
be used to correct faulty intuitions or that such 
correction is never required. The key assumption 
we test in the present study is whether correct 
responding results from deliberate correction of a 
faulty intuition. We examined whether sound 
reasoners respond correctly precisely because 
they manage to complete this correction process. 
Our results show that this is not necessarily the 
case. Often, correct responders have nothing to 
correct. However, this does not imply that 
correction is redundant for everyone. Our results 
do not imply that everyone manages to generate 
the correct answer intuitively. As we noted, the 
vast majority of reasoners gives the faulty 
intuitive “10 cents” response both at the initial 
response stage and after deliberation. Hence, not 
everyone will generate a correct (intuitive) 
response. For most reasoners, the incorrect 
intuition will dominate. Consequently, our 
empirical results directly argue against the idea 
that correction of System 1 is never needed. And 
it might very well be the case that additional 
deliberation could be helpful in these cases. 
Imagine that we devise an intervention procedure 
that allows us to train biased reasoners to 
deliberately correct. This might very well reduce 
bias and boost correct responses. Our results do 
not speak to this issue. Hence, the present 
findings do not imply that interventions are 
pointless or that deliberate correction is 
impossible or redundant. Our point here is that 
spontaneous sound reasoning does not 
necessarily require such correction. It is this 
central assumption of the corrective view that our 
results question. 
 As we clarified in the introduction, 
literally hundreds of studies have focused on the 
bat-and-ball problem in the last ten years. One 
common objection to our study might be that if 
the non-correction phenomenon and correct “5 
cents” intuitions are really so ubiquitous, then 
why has this phenomenon not been documented 
previously? We believe that the simple answer is 
that scholars haven’t really looked for it. Note 
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that we were only able to identify the correct 
intuitions by carving up the reasoning process 
with the two-response paradigm (Thompson et 
al., 2011). In a traditional “one-response” 
experiment System 1 and 2 processing will go 
hand in hand. That is, the correct intuitive 
responders will typically back up their System 1 
processing with System 2 deliberation to validate 
their answer. Reasoners will not end their 
reasoning process after they have come up with a 
correct intuitive response. This implies, for 
example, that the final response generation for 
those who give the correct response will still take 
longer than for those who give an incorrect 
response and do not engage (or engage less 
profoundly) in System 2 deliberation9. It is only 
by experimentally isolating the initial reasoning 
stage that we were able to demonstrate the 
correct nature of the initially generated response 
in these cases. Bluntly put, it is unlikely that a 
pure correct intuitive response will be observed 
“in the wild”.  Just as with other non-
naturalistically perceivable scientific phenomena 
(Niaz, 2009) we suspect that this helps to explain 
why the non-corrective nature of System 2 
deliberation has gone largely unnoticed in 
empirical studies. 
 To be very clear, we are not the first to 
point towards the potential of intuitive 
processing. We referred to the intuition-as-guide 
view to illustrate how more than a century ago 
leading scientists already argued that the origin of 
their key insights relied on intuitive processing. 
Furthermore, within the cognitive sciences 
various scholars have developed related ideas in a 
range of frameworks (e.g., Dijksterhuis’ 
Unconscious Thinking Theory, 2011; 
Gigerenzer’s Fast and Frugal Heuristics, 2007; 
Klein’s Naturalistic Decision Making, 2004; 
Reyna’s Fuzzy-Trace Theory, 2012). More 
                                                             
9 This also implies that one’s performance on the bat-
and-ball or related problems (e.g., items from the 
Cognitive Reflection test, Frederick, 2005) is still a 
valid measure of one’s tendency to reflect or 
deliberate. The present data indicate that correct 
responders are still more likely to deliberate (or are 
better at deliberation) than incorrect responders (i.e., 
after deliberation they manage to justify their 
response). The point is simply that the nature of this 
deliberation process does not necessarily lie in a 
correction process but rather in a justification process.  
specifically, Peters (2012) has explicitly raised 
the possibility that good reasoners might manage 
to arrive at the correct response in the bat-and-
ball problem precisely because they have correct 
intuitions. The critical contribution of our study 
lies in the empirical demonstration of this 
phenomenon. More generally, one might argue 
that even the traditional dual process framework 
can accommodate the present findings with some 
additional qualification. One general feature of 
dual process models is that with practice and 
experience processes that initially need System 2 
deliberation can be automatized and handled by 
System 1 (Epstein, 1994; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013; Kahneman, 2011; Sloman, 1996). In a way, 
such automatization is precisely what we hope to 
achieve in many teaching or learning contexts 
(e.g., Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). Solving the 
bat-and-ball problem boils down to solving the 
algebraic equation “X + Y = 1.10, Y = 1 + X, 
Solve for X”. This is something that all educated 
adults have done at length in their high school 
math classes. One can account for the present 
findings by assuming that years of exposure to 
this type of problem solving helped sound 
reasoners to automatize the solution process. 
Consequently, there would no longer be a need 
for deliberate correction. We would not object to 
the idea that such automatization may lie at the 
heart of the currently observed correct intuitive 
responding. Hence, although the current findings 
argue against the traditional corrective dual 
process view they do not necessarily invalidate 
the wider framework itself. But it underscores the 
need for any viable dual process model to fully 
recognize and embrace the potential of System 1 
(e.g., Stanovich, 2018; Thompson, Pennycook, 
Trippas, & Evans, 2018, for related suggestions).  
 Proponents of the traditional corrective 
view can try to point to a fundamental 
methodological limitation of our study. We used 
a two-response paradigm in which we tried to 
make sure that the initial responses were intuitive 
in nature by combing an instruction, time-
pressure, and load manipulation. All these 
manipulations have been previously shown to 
limit System 2 deliberation. By combining them 
we believe we created one the most stringent and 
purest operationalisations of System 1 processing 
that have been adopted in the dual process 
literature to date. However, critics might argue 
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that we can never be completely sure that we 
eliminated all System 2 processing. In theory, 
this is correct. The general problem is that dual 
process theories are underspecified (Kruglanski, 
2013). The framework often entails that System 2 
is slower and more demanding than System 1 but 
gives us no unequivocal a priori criterion that 
allows us to classify a process as System 1 or 2 
(e.g., takes at least x time, or x amount of load). 
Consequently, as long as we keep on observing 
correct initial responses, one can always argue 
that these will disappear “with just a little bit 
more load/time pressure”. Note, however, that the 
corrective assumption becomes unfalsifiable at 
this point. Any negative evidence can always be 
explained away by arguing that the procedure did 
not fully rule out deliberation.  
 On the other hand, we readily agree that 
further testing and replication is always welcome. 
The present study is but the first to document the 
non-corrective nature of the “5 cents” response. 
This finding questions the common wisdom in 
the field. As one of our reviewers put it, 
“extraordinary claims need extraordinary 
evidence”. Although we ran seven studies to test 
the robustness of our findings, further validation 
remains important.  For example, future studies 
might try to identify the precise boundary 
conditions under which correct initial responses 
are observed by systematically setting stricter 
deadlines and/or adopting alternative, more 
challenging load tasks, testing for individual 
differences, etc. In this light, one might also note 
that we used an operational definition of 
intuitive, System 1 processing that focused on 
speed and effort. Although these are typical 
features that are often used to differentiate 
System 1 and 2 processing, other characteristics 
can be put forward. For example, one such 
alternative defining characteristic of System 1 
processing might be its “autonomy” (i.e., 
processing is either mandatory given the presence 
of triggering conditions – System 1 – or not 
mandatory – System 2, e.g., Pennycook, 2017). 
In as far as autonomy is independent from speed 
and effort, one could still argue that the initial 
response in our paradigm results from deliberate, 
System 2 processing (i.e., the fast and 
undemanding initial response would not be 
mandatory and hence, be deliberate and not 
intuitive in nature). We personally have some 
difficulties envisaging how one would 
operationalize and test such an account but we 
acknowledge that it is a theoretical possibility. 
Another limitation is that although we identified 
correct initial responses we haven’t specified the 
nature of these responses. The precise mechanism 
behind the generation of correct “5 cents” 
intuitions is not clear.  Above we alluded to the 
possibility that these might result from an 
automatization process through repeated 
exposure in a formal educational setting. 
Obviously, this is a speculative claim that we 
haven’t tested directly. We fully agree that 
pinpointing the precise nature of the postulated 
intuitions remains an important challenge (De 
Neys, 2017). 
 A final objection against the current 
work might be that it focused exclusively on the 
bat-and-ball problem. One easy way out for 
proponents of the corrective view would be to 
argue that our findings simply imply that the field 
has mistakenly characterized the bat-and-ball 
problem as a prototypical example of the 
correction process. Hence, the corrective view 
could be maintained but it would simply need to 
change its poster boy. This is problematic for 
several reasons. First, if we post hoc classify a 
particular task that does not fit the predictions as 
an exceptional case, we end up with a framework 
that has hardly any explanatory power. But more 
critically, the current findings have also been 
observed with other classic reasoning tasks such 
as belief-bias syllogisms and base-rate neglect 
tasks (Bago & De Neys, 2017; Newman et al., 
2017). Hence, it is not the case that the observed 
non-correction is some idiosyncratic peculiarity 
of the bat-and-ball problem that would fail to 
generalize to other tasks. Nevertheless, belief-
bias and base-rate neglect problems are easier 
(i.e., show lower bias rates) than the bat-and-ball 
problem and there is less a priori agreement on 
how representative they are to test the corrective 
view (Aczel et al., 2016; Evans, 2017; Mata et 
al., 2017; Singmann et al., 2014; Travers et al., 
2016; Pennycook et al., 2012). By showing that 
the corrective prediction does not hold up in the 
specific case that is considered to be one of its 
strongholds, we believe we provide a critical test 
that should at least force us to question a strict 
corrective dual process view of deliberation. 
Deliberation is undoubtedly critical for human 
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thinking, but sound reasoners do not necessarily 
need it to correct faulty intuitions.   
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Table 1. Initial and final average (SD) response accuracy in study 1-5.  
Study  Response format Conflict items No-conflict control items 
Initial 
response 
Final 
response 
Initial 
response 
Final 
response 
Study1 2 response 20.1% (40.2) 24.5% (43.1) 93.4% (24.9) 96.0% (19.6) 
Study2a 2 response 7.7% (26.7) 7.3% (26.1) 94.6% (22.6) 96.5% (18.5) 
Study2b 4 response 9.0% (28.6) 10.8% (31.1) 94.9% (22) 95.1% (21.6) 
Study3a 2 response 23.9% (42.8) 28.3% (45.2) 96.3% (18.9) 97.1% (17) 
Study3b 4 response 19.0% (39.4) 29.5% (45.3) 95.6% (20.6) 97.1% (17) 
Study4 Free response 10.9% (31.3) 13.1% (33.9) 96.4% (18.8) 99.3% (8.5) 
Study5 Free response 30.5% (46.2) 41.4% (49.4) 93.8% (24.2) 98.1% (13.6) 
 
Average 
 
2 response 14.7% (34.4) 15.4% (36.1) 94.5% (22.9) 96.4% (18.6) 
4 response 11.1% (31.5) 14.6% (35.4)  95.0% (21.7) 95.5% (20.7) 
Free response 20.4% (40.4) 26.8% (44.4) 95.0% (21.9) 98.7% (11.5) 
 
Overall average 13.8% (34.5) 16.8% (37.4) 94.7% (22.3) 96.5% (18.5)  
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Table 2. Frequency of direction of change categories in study 1-5 for conflict items. Raw number 
of trials are in brackets. 
Study  Response 
format 
Direction of change category Non-
correction 
(11/11+01) 
 
11 
 
00 
 
10 
 
01 
Study1 2 response 16.5% (45) 71.8% (196) 3.7% (10) 8.1% (22) 67.2% 
Study2a 2 response 4.5% (24) 89.5% (475) 3.2% (17) 2.8% (15) 61.5% 
Study2b 4 response 8.6% (42) 88.8% (436) 0.4% (2) 2.2% (11) 79.2% 
Study3a 2 response 16.7% (23) 64.5% (89) 7.2% (10) 11.6% (16) 59% 
Study3b 4 response 19.0% (26) 71.5% (98) - 9.5% (13) 66.7% 
Study4 Free response 10.9% (15) 86.7% (119) - 2.2% (3) 83.3% 
Study5 Free response 29.7% (38) 57.8% (74) 0.8% (1)  11.7% (15) 71.7% 
 
Average 
 
2 response 9.8% (92) 80.7% (760) 3.9% (37) 5.6% (53) 
 
63.4% 
4 response 10.8% (68) 85.0% (534) 0.3% (2) 3.8% (24) 73.9% 
Free response 20.0% (53) 72.8% (193) 0.4% (1) 7.0% (18) 74.6% 
 
Overall average 10.9% (198) 81.7% (1487) 2.2% (40) 5.2% (95) 
 
67.6%  
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Table 3. Frequency of stability index values on conflict items in Study 1-5. The raw number of 
participants for each value is presented between brackets. 
Study Response 
format 
Stability index value Average 
stability <33% 50% 66% 75% 100% 
Study1 2 response 3.6% (3) 10.7% (9) 8.3% (7) 9.5% (8) 67.9% (57) 87.1% 
Study2a 2 response 2.4% (4) 3.0% (5) 4.8% (8) 6.6% (11) 83.2% (139) 93.7% 
Study2b 4 response 3.5% (5) 1.4% (2) 2.8% (4) 4.2% (6) 88.1% (126) 95.0% 
Study3a 2 response 4.9% (2) 19.5% (8) 7.3% (3) 12.2% (5) 56.1% (23) 81.5% 
Study3b 4 response 2.3% (1) 7.0% (3) 14.0% (6) 2.3% (1) 74.4% (32) 89.7% 
Study4 Free response - 2.6% (1) 5.1% (2) - 92.3% (36) 97.0% 
Study5 Free response - 19.5% (8) 9.8% (4) 9.8% (4) 61.0% (25) 84.6% 
 
Average 
 
2 response 3.1% (9) 7.5% (22) 6.2% (18) 8.2% (24) 75.0% (219) 90.0% 
4 response 3.2% (6) 2.7% (5) 5.4% (10) 3.8% (7) 84.9% (158) 93.7% 
Free response - 11.3% (9) 7.5% (6) 5.0% (4) 76.5% (61) 90.6% 
 
Overall average 2.7% (15) 6.5% (36) 6.1% (34) 6.3% (35) 78.5% (438) 91.3% 
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Table 4. Initial and final accuracies (SD) in justification studies (Study 6-7). 
Study  Response format Conflict items No-conflict control items 
Initial response Final response Initial response Final response 
Study 6 2 response 32.2% (32.2) 37.8% (37.8) 86.8% (86.8) 94.5% (94.5) 
Study 7a 2 response 28.9% (45.7) 34.2% (47.8) 90.8% (29.1) 100% (0) 
Study 7b  Free response 17% (37.8) 48.9% (50.3) 92.5% (26.4) 100% (0) 
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Table 5. Frequency of each direction of change category for the conflict items in each 
justification study (Study 6-7). Raw number of trials are in brackets. 
Study  Response 
format 
Direction of change category Non-
correction 
(11/11+01) 
 
11 
 
00 
 
10 
 
01 
Study 6 2 response 22.2% (20) 52.2% (47) 10% (9) 15.5% (14) 58.8% 
Study 7a 2 response 21.1% (16) 57.9% (44) 7.9% (6) 13.2% (10) 61.5% 
Study 7b Free response 14.77% (13) 48.86% (43) 2.27% (2) 34.1% (30) 30.2% 
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Table 6. Frequency of different types of justifications for conflict items in Study 6 and 7 (raw 
number of justifications in brackets). 
Study  Justification Initial response Final response 
 Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
Study 6 
2 response 
Correct math 20.7% (6) 1.6% (1) 60.6% (20) 5.6% (3) 
Incorrect math - 24.6% (15) - 33.3% (18) 
Unspecified math - 14.8% (9) 6.1% (2) 44.4% (24) 
Hunch 3.4% (1) 6.6% (4) 6.1% (2) - 
Guess 34.5% (10) 9.8% (6) 3% (1) 3.7% (2) 
Previous  20.7% (6) 6.6% (4) 6.1% (2) 1.9% (1) 
Other 20.7% (6) 36.1% (22) 18.2% (6) 11.1% (6) 
      
Study 7 
2 response 
 
 
 
 
Correct math 9.1% (2) 1.9% (1) 96.2% (25) 2% (1) 
Incorrect math - 37% (20) - 69.4% (34) 
Unspecified math 9.1% (2) 9.3% (5) 3.8% (1) 16.3% (8) 
Hunch 45.5% (10) 27.8% (15) - 2% (1) 
Guess 36.4% (8) 24.1% (13) - 10.2% (5) 
Other - - - - 
      
Study 7 
Free response 
 
 
 
 
 
Correct math 26.7%(4) - 90.7% (39) 2.2% (1) 
Incorrect math - 38.6% (28) - 68.9% (31) 
Unspecified math 6.7% (1) 4.1% (3) 4.7% (2) 17.8% (8) 
Hunch 46.7% (7) 30.1% (22) - 4.4% (2) 
Guess 13.3% (2) 23.3% (17) - 6.7% (3) 
Other 6.7% (1) 4.1% (3) 4.7% (2) - 
 
  
34 
 
Supplementary Material 
 
A. Problems used in study 1-7 
 
Items used in Study 1-6: 
 Conflict version Control version 
1 A pencil and an eraser cost $1.10 in total. 
The pencil costs $1 more than the eraser. 
How much does the eraser cost?  
A pencil and an eraser cost $1.10 in total. 
The pencil costs $1. 
How much does the eraser cost? 
2 A magazine and a banana cost $2.60 in total. 
The magazine costs $2 more than the banana. 
How much does the banana cost?  
A magazine and a banana cost $2.60 in total. 
The magazine costs $2. 
How much does the banana cost?  
3 A cheese and a bread cost $2.90 in total. 
The cheese costs $2 more than the bread. 
How much does the bread cost? 
A cheese and a bread cost $2.90 in total. 
The cheese costs $2. 
How much does the bread cost? 
4 An apple and an orange cost $1.80 in total. 
The apple costs $1 more than the orange. 
How much does the orange cost?  
An apple and an orange cost $1.80 in total. 
The apple costs $1. 
How much does the orange cost?  
5 A sandwich and a soda cost $2.50 in total. 
The sandwich costs $2 more than the soda. 
How much does the soda cost?  
A sandwich and a soda cost $2.50 in total. 
The sandwich costs $2. 
How much does the soda cost?  
6 A hat and a ribbon cost $4.20 in total. 
The hat costs $4 more than the ribbon. 
How much does the ribbon cost?  
A hat and a ribbon cost $4.20 in total. 
The hat costs $4. 
How much does the ribbon cost?  
7 A coffee and a cookie cost $2.40 in total. 
The coffee costs $2 more than the cookie. 
How much does the cookie cost?  
A coffee and a cookie cost $2.40 in total. 
The coffee costs $2. 
How much does the cookie cost?  
8 A book and a bookmark cost $3.30 in total. 
The book costs $3 more than the bookmark. 
How much does the bookmark cost? 
A book and a bookmark cost $3.30 in total. 
The book costs $3. 
How much does the bookmark cost? 
 
Response options for each of the problems in Study 1-6: 
 2 response options 4 response options 
1 5, 10 1, 5, 10, 15 
2 30, 60 15, 30, 60, 90 
3 45, 90 15, 45, 90, 135 
4 40, 80 20, 40, 80, 120 
5 25, 50  5, 25, 50, 75 
6 10, 20 5, 10, 20, 30 
7 20, 40 10, 20, 40, 60 
8 15, 30 5, 15, 30, 45 
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Items used in Study 7: 
 Conflict version Control version 
1 An apple and an orange weigh 160 grams altogether.  
The apple weighs 100 grams more than the orange.  
How much does the orange weigh? 
An apple and an orange weigh 160 grams altogether.  
The apple weighs 100 grams. 
How much does the orange weigh? 
2 In a shop there are 250 PCs and MACs altogether. 
There are 200 more PCs than MACs. 
How many MACs are there in the shop? 
In a shop there are 250 PCs and MACs altogether. 
There are 200 PCs. 
How many MACs are there in the shop? 
3 Altogether, a book and a magazine have 330 pages. 
The book has 300 pages more than the magazine. 
How many pages does the magazine have? 
Altogether, a book and a magazine have 330 pages. 
The book has 300 pages. 
How many pages does the magazine have? 
4 In total, a plumber and an electrician work 240 days. 
The electrician works 200 days more than the plumber.  
How many days does the plumber work? 
In total, a plumber and an electrician work 240 days. 
The electrician works 200 days.  
How many days does the plumber work? 
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B. Conflict detection analysis Study 1-5 
 
For each direction of change category one may ask whether reasoners are faced with two 
competing intuitions at the first response stage. We can address this question by looking at the 
contrast between conflict and control problems. If conflict problems cue two conflicting initial 
intuitive responses, people should process the problems differently than the no-conflict problems 
(in which such conflict is absent) in the initial response stage and show lower confidence and 
longer response latencies (e.g., Botvinick, 2007; De Neys, 2012; Johnson et al., 2016; Pennycook 
et al., 2015) when solving the conflict problems. Therefore, we contrasted the confidence ratings 
and response times10 for the initial response on the conflict problems with those for the initial 
response on the no-conflict problems for each of the four direction of change categories. Note 
that we used only the dominant control 11 category for this contrast (which we will refer to as 
“baseline”), as responses in the other control direction of change categories cannot be interpreted 
unequivocally.  
Table S1 (confidence) and S2 (latencies) show the results. Visual inspection of Table S1 
indicates that there is a general trend towards a decreased initial confidence when solving 
conflict problems for all direction of change categories. However, this effect is much larger for 
the 01 and 10 cases in which reasoners subsequently changed their initial response. This suggests 
that although reasoners might be experiencing some conflict between competing intuitions in all 
cases, this conflict is much more pronounced in the 10 and 01 case. Latency data in Table S2 
mirrors this pattern. In all change categories, it took more time to give a response on conflict 
items but this latency increase is most pronounced in case people ended up changing their initial 
response. 
To analyse the data statistically we again created mixed effect multi-level models 
(Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017). We ran a 
separate analysis for each of the four direction of change conflict problem categories and we 
analysed both confidence and reaction times. In the analysis, the confidence or reaction time for 
the initial response in a given direction of change category in question was contrasted with the 
initial response confidence or reaction time for 11 control problems which served as our 
baseline. We will refer to this contrast as the conflict factor. The conflict factor was entered as 
fixed factor, and participants and items were entered as random factor. We also entered the 
response format (2 response vs 4 response vs free response) as fixed factor mainly to test for an 
interaction with the conflict factor. In the cases in which we found a significant interaction we 
also analysed each response format condition separately. We were not interested in main effects 
of the response format (e.g., simply because of the different deadlines, responses will be faster 
for some studies than for others) and did not analyse it further to avoid spurious findings. Note 
that prior to analysis reaction times were log-transformed to normalize the distribution, and 
analysis were performed on the log-transformed data.  
11 Category. In terms of confidence, we found that conflict improved model fit 
significantly, χ2 (1) = 43.6, p < 0.0001, as well as the main effect of response format, χ2 (3) = 
7.63, p = 0.022, but not their interaction, χ2 (5) = 1.3, p = 0.52.  Hence, people were less 
confident in the 11 conflict category than in the baseline, b = -12.2, t (193.2) = -10.83, p < 
                                                             
10 Note that the initial response time analysis should be interpreted with some caution. Previous two-response studies 
established that response times do not reliably track conflict detection effects reflected in confidence ratings at the 
initial response stage (Bago & De Neys, 2017; Thompson & Johnson, 2014). 
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0.0001. Similar results were found with regard to reaction times as well; conflict improved 
model fit significantly, χ2 (1) = 21.73, p < 0.0001, as well as the main effect of response format, 
χ2 (3) = 554.9, p < 0.0001, but not their interaction, χ2 (5) = 2.23, p = 0.33. Thus, it took more 
time to give a response in the 11 conflict category, than in the baseline, b = 0.05, t (127.8) = 5.4, 
p < 0.0001.   
00 category. With regard to confidence, the main effect of conflict improved model fit 
significantly, χ2 (1) = 12.6, p = 0.0004, but neither response format, χ2 (3) = 5.5, p = 0.06, nor 
their interaction did, χ2 (5) = 4.6, p = 0.1. Hence, people were less confident in their response in 
the 00 conflict category than in baseline, b = -3.1, t (12.93) = -4.3, p = 0.0008. For reaction 
times, we found that conflict improved model fit, χ2 (1) = 7.04, p = 0.008, along with the main 
effect of response format, χ2 (3) = 559.3, p < 0.0001, but not their interaction, χ2 (5) = 1.84, p = 
0.4. Hence, it took people more time to give a response in the 00 conflict category than in the 
baseline, b = 0.02, t (13.7) = 2.9, p = 0.01. 
10 category. For confidence, we found that model fit was improved by conflict, χ2 (1) = 
50.1, p < 0.0001, and the main effect of response format, χ2 (3) = 6.6, p = 0.036. Their 
interaction did not improve model fit significantly, χ2 (5) = 3.3, p = 0.19. Therefore, people were 
less confident in the 10 conflict category than in the baseline, b = -49.5, t (834.9) = -21.9, p < 
0.0001. For reaction times, we found that only response format improved the model fit 
significantly, χ2 (3) = 557.3, p < 0.0001, but not conflict, χ2 (1) = 1.25, p = 0.26, and not their 
interaction, χ2 (5) = 1.9, p = 0.39.  
01 category. Regarding confidence, we found that conflict improved model fit 
significantly, χ2 (1) = 50.8, p < 0.0001. There was no main effect of response format, χ2 (3) = 3.4, 
p = 0.18, but format and conflict did interact, χ2 (5) = 60.25, p < 0.0001. We analysed each of the 
three response format conditions separately and found that in every condition people were less 
confident in the 01 conflict category than in the baseline, b < -21.4, t < -9.7, p < 0.0001. With 
respect to reaction times, we found that conflict improved model fit significantly, χ2 (1) = 28.6, p 
< 0.0001, as well as the main effect of condition, χ2 (3) = 566.4, p < 0.0001, but not their 
interaction, χ2 (5) = 2.1, p = 0.34. It took participants longer to give a response in the 01 conflict 
category than in the baseline, b = 0.09, t (324.5) = 6.8, p < 0.0001. 
 Taken together, the conflict detection analysis on the confidence and latency data 
indicates that by and large participants showed decreased response confidence and increased 
response times (in contrast with the no-conflict baseline) after having given their first, intuitive 
response on the conflict problems in all direction of change categories. This supports the 
hypothesis that participants were always being faced with two conflicting intuitive responses 
when solving the conflict bat-and-ball problems. In other words, results imply that 11 responders 
also activate a heuristic “10 cents” intuition in addition to the logical correct “5 cents” response 
they selected. Likewise, 00 responders also seem to detect that there is an alternative to the 
incorrect “10 cents” response. Although this points to some minimal error sensitivity (De Neys et 
al., 2013; Johnson et al., 2016) among incorrect responders, it does not imply that incorrect 
responders also realize that the correct response is “5 cents” (Travers et al., 2016). The error 
sensitivity or increased doubt for incorrect responders might result from a less specific intuition 
(e.g., maybe incorrect responders doubted that their “10 cents” was correct without knowing that 
the correct response was “5 cents”). More generally speaking, it is possible that the correct 
intuition differs in strength and/or specificity for correct and incorrect responders. Clearly, the 
present study was designed and optimized to draw conclusions about the nature of correct 
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responders’ intuitions. Claims with respect to the nature of incorrect responders’ intuitions 
remain speculative and will need further validation in future studies.    
 
Finally, visual inspection also clearly shows that the conflict effects were much larger for 
the 10 and 01 cases than for the 11 and 00 ones. A contrast analysis11 that tested this trend 
directly indicated that this trend was significant for confidence data, Z = -15.4, p < 0.0001, (r = 
0.11 for the no-change group, while r = 0.5 for the change group), and reaction times, Z = -2.35, 
p (one-tailed) = 0.009, (r = 0.07 for no-change and r = 0.13 for change group). This pattern 
suggests that although reasoners might be generating two intuitive responses and are being 
affected by conflict between them in all cases, this conflict is much more pronounced in cases 
where people subsequently change their answer. This tentatively suggests that it is this more 
pronounced conflict experience that makes them subsequently change their answer (Bago & De 
Neys, 2017; Thompson et al., 2012). 
 
  
                                                             
11 For this contrast analysis, we first calculated the r effect sizes out of t-values (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 2003). As a 
next step we used Fisher r-to-z transformation to assess the statistical difference between the two independent r-
values. We used the following calculator for the z-transformation and p-value calculation: 
http://vassarstats.net/rdiff.html 
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Table S1. Average confidence differences (SD) at the initial response stage between the baseline (11 responses on 
no-conflict problems) and conflict problems for each direction of change category. 
 Response format 11 00 10 01 
Study1 2 response 8.4 (3.4) 2.5 (1.9) 52 (9.97) 25.7 (7.6) 
Study2a 2 response 14.7 (5.6) 1.7 (1.2) 50.1 (8.1) 19.4 (8.7) 
Study2b 4 response 9.6 (4.9) 4.8 (1.5) 42.4 (48.5) 41.8 (10.6) 
Study3a 2 response 27.8 (7.7) 7.9 (3.5) 65.7 (7.8) 29.1 (7.6) 
Study3b 4 response 12.5 (5.4) 9.8 (3.4)  - 32.6 (10.2) 
Study4 Free response 10.3 (6.2) 1.2 (0.9)  - 34.3 (32.5) 
Study5 Free response 8.6 (3.5) 9.2 (3.6) 95.7 (-) 55 (10.2) 
 
Average 
 
2 response 15.7 (2.8) 2.4 (1) 55.0 (5.1) 25.7 (4.5) 
4 response 10.8 (3.7) 5.7 (1.4) 42.3 (48.5) 36.9 (7.3) 
Free response 9.8 (3) 3.7 (1.6) 97.4 (-) 52.7 (9.8) 
 
Overall average 12.3 (1.9) 3.8 (0.7) 56.1 (5.1) 33.5 (3.7) 
 
 
Table S2. Average reaction time differences in ms (SD) at the initial response stage between the baseline (11 
responses on no-conflict problems) and conflict problems for each direction of change category. Note that averages 
are based on geometrical means.  
 Response format  11 00 10 01 
Study1 2 response -300 (196.4) -200 (124.8) -350 (521.5) -770 (290.7) 
Study2a 2 response -230 (291.6) -40 (90.3) 180 (388.7) -60 (373.8) 
Study2b 4 response -550 (239) -170 (93.6) 200 (1944) -230 (472.3) 
Study3a 2 response -510 (302.4) -60 (191.6) -470 (473) -390 (334.7) 
Study3b 4 response -470 (276.9) 50 (199.3) - -900 (386.9) 
Study4 Free response -230 (389.3) -220 (183.8) - -3230 (658.1) 
Study5 Free response -300 (235.4) -210 (187.2) -2340 (-) -1640 (326) 
 
Average 
 
2 response -400 (143.5) -60 (68.7) -120 (267.4) -490 (195.1) 
4 response -580 (181.1) -120 (84.8) 270 (1943.8) -670 (307.7) 
Free response -440 (202.5) -100 (131.2) -2750 (-) -2170 (291.6) 
 
Overall average -720 (113.8) -30 (55.7) 270 (269.2) -760 (175.4) 
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C. Data for no-conflict control problems  
 
The tables in this section give an overview of the direction of change (Table S3), stability (Table 
S4), and justification data (Table S5 & S6) on the no-conflict control problems. 
 
 
Table S3. Frequency of direction of change categories for no-conflict control problems in Study 1-5. The raw 
number of trials in each category is presented between brackets. 
 Response format 11 00 10 01 
Study1 2 response 93.0% (281) 3.6% (11) 0.3% (1) 3.0% (9) 
Study2a 2 response 93.9% (504) 2.8% (15) 0.7% (4) 2.6% (14) 
Study2b 4 response 93.3% (457) 3.3% (16) 1.6% (8) 1.8% (9) 
Study3a 2 response 94.9% (129) 1.5% (2) 1.5% (2) 2.2% (3) 
Study3b 4 response 94.1% (128) 1.5% (2) 1.5% (2) 2.9% (4) 
Study4 Free response 96.4% (132) 0.77% (1) - 2.9% (4) 
Study5 Free response 92.5% (149) 0.6% (1) 1.2% (2)  5.6% (9) 
 
Average 
 
2 response 93.7% (914) 2.9% (28) 0.7% (7) 2.7% (26) 
4 response 93.5% (585) 2.9% (18) 1.6% (10) 2.1% (13) 
Free response 94.5% (281) 0.7% (2) 0.7% (2) 4.4% (13) 
 
Overall average 93.8% (1780) 2.5% (48) 1.0% (19) 2.7% (52) 
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Table S4. Frequency of stability index values on no-conflict control problems in Study 1-5. The raw number of 
participants in each category is presented between brackets.  
 Response 
format 
<33% 50% 66% 75% 100% Average 
stability 
Study1 2 response 1.2% (1) 2.3% (2) 4.6% (4) 5.8% (5) 86.2% (75) 95.1% 
Study2a 2 response - 1.3% (2) 5.0% (8) 5.7% (9) 88.1% (140) 96.3% 
Study2b 4 response - 2.8% (4) 4.9% (7) 4.2% (6) 88.2% (127) 96.0% 
Study3a 2 response 2.4% (1) 4.9% (2) 4.9% (2) 2.4% (1) 85.4% (35) 94.7% 
Study3b 4 response - 4.9% (2) 4.9% (2) 4.9% (2) 85.4% (35) 96.4% 
Study4 Free response - - 5.1% (2) 7.7% (3) 87.2% (34) 93.0% 
Study5 Free response - 2.3% (1) 2.3% (1) 20.5% (9) 75.0% (33) 95.0% 
 
Average 
 
2 response 0.7% (2) 2.1% (6) 4.9% (14) 5.2% (15) 87.2% (251) 95.5% 
4 response - 3.2% (6) 4.9% (9) 4.3% (8) 87.6% (162) 95.6% 
Free response - 1.2% (1) 3.6% (3) 14.5% (12) 80.7% (67) 94.6% 
 
Overall average 0.4% (2) 2.3% (13) 4.7% (26) 6.3% (35) 86.3% (480) 95.4% 
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Table S5. Frequency of different justification categories for no-conflict control problems in Study 6. The raw 
number of justifications in each category is presented between brackets. 
Justification Initial response Final response 
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
Correct math 39.6% (19) - 56.5% (48) - 
Incorrect math - - - 20% (1) 
Unspecified math 10.4% (5) - 23.5% (20) - 
Hunch 6.3% (3) - 1.2% (1) - 
Guess 6.3% (3) 25% (3) 1.2% (1) 40% (2) 
Previous  6.3% (3) 25% (3) 3.5% (3) - 
Other 31.3% (15) 50% (6) 14.1% (12) 40% (2) 
 
 
 
Table S6. Frequency of different justification categories for no-conflict control problems in Study 7. The raw 
number of justifications in each category is presented between brackets. 
Response format Justification Initial response Final response 
 Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
2 response 
 
 
 
 
Correct math 51.9% (41) - 82.8% (72) - 
Incorrect math - - - - 
Unspecified math 17.7% (12) 12.5% (1) 12.6% (11) - 
Hunch 19% (15) 25% (2) 3.4% (3) - 
Guess 10.2% (8) 37.5% (3) - - 
Other 1.2% (1) 25% (2) 1.1% (1) - 
      
Free response 
 
 
 
 
 
Correct math 68.7% (68) 12.5% (1) 95.3% (102) - 
Incorrect math - - - - 
Unspecified math 2% (2) - 0.9% (1) - 
Hunch 15.2% (15) 12.5% (1) 0.9% (1) - 
Guess 14.1% (14) 62.5% (5) 1.9% (2) - 
Other - 12.5% (1) 0.9% (1) - 
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D. Full procedure reading pre-tests Study 1 and Study 2  
 
Reading pre-test Study 1. Before we ran the main study we also recruited an independent 
sample of 64 participants for a reading pre-test (31 female, Mean age = 38.9 years, SD = 13.1 
years). Participants were recruited via the Crowdflower platform, and they received $0.10. A 
total of 41% of the subjects reported high school as highest completed educational level, and 
58% reported having a post-secondary education degree (1% reported less than high school). The 
basic goal of the reading pre-test was to determine the response deadline which could be applied 
in the main reasoning study.  The idea was to base the response deadline on the average reading 
time in the reading test. Note that dual process theories are highly underspecified in many 
aspects (Kruglanski, 2013); they argue that System 1 is faster than System 2, but do not further 
specify how fast System 1 is exactly (e.g., System 1 < x seconds). Hence, the theory gives us nu 
unequivocal criterion on which we can base our deadline. Our “average reading time” criterion 
provides a practical solution to define the response deadline. The rationale here was very simple; 
if people are allotted the time they need to simply read the problem, we can be reasonably sure 
that System 2 engagement is minimal. Thus, in the reading pre-test, participants were presented 
with the same items as in the reasoning study. They were instructed to read the problems and 
randomly click on one of the answer options. Of course, we wanted to avoid that participants 
would spontaneously engage in any type of reasoning in the pre-test. Therefore, the answer 
options were randomly selected numbers (to which we drew participant’s attention in the 
instructions) to make it less likely that reading participants would try to solve the problems. The 
general instructions were as follows: 
  
Welcome to the experiment! 
Please read these instructions carefully! 
This experiment is composed of 8 questions and 1 practice question. It will take 3 minutes to 
complete and it demands your full attention. You can only do this experiment once. 
In this task we'll present you with a set of problems we are planning to use in future studies. Your 
task in the current study is pretty simple: you just need to read these problems. We want to know 
how long people need on average to read the material. In each problem you will be presented with 
two answer alternatives. You don’t need to try to solve the problems or start thinking about them. 
Just read the problem and the answer alternatives and when you are finished reading you randomly 
click on one of the answers to advance to the next problem. In each problem you will be presented 
with two answer alternatives. These answer alternatives are simply randomly generated numbers. 
You don’t need to try to solve the problems or start thinking about them. 
The only thing we ask of you is that you stay focused and read the problems in the way you typically 
would. Since we want to get an accurate reading time estimate please avoid whipping your nose, 
taking a phone call, sipping from your coffee, etc. before you finished reading. 
At the end of the study we will present you with some easy verification questions to check whether 
you actually read the problems. This is simply to make sure that participants are complying with the 
instructions and actually read the problems (instead of clicking through them without paying 
attention). No worries, when you simply read the problems, you will have no trouble at all at 
answering the verification questions. 
 
You will receive $0.10 for completing this experiment. 
Please confirm below that you read these instructions carefully and then press the "Next" button. 
 
To make sure that participants would actually read the problems, we informed subjects 
that they would be asked to answer two – very easy - verification questions at the end of the 
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experiment to check whether they read the material. The verification questions could be easily 
answered even by a very rough reading. The following illustrates the verification question:  
 
We asked you to read a number of problems. 
Which one of the following pair of goods were NOT presented during the task? 
o A laptop and a mouse 
o A pencil and an eraser 
o An apple and an orange 
o A banana and a magazine 
 
The correct answers were clearly different from the goods which were presented during 
the task. A total of 84.4% of the participants solved both verification questions correctly, and 
only the data from these participants was analysed. 
As in the main experiment, items were presented serially. First, the first sentence of the 
problem was presented for 2000 ms. Next, the full problem appeared on the screen. Reading 
times were measured from the presentation of the full problem.  The average reading time of the 
sample was M = 3.87 sec, SD = 2.18 sec. Note that raw reaction time data were first 
logarithmically transformed prior to analysis. Mean and standard deviation were calculated on 
the transformed data, and then they were back-transformed into seconds. We wanted to give the 
participants some minimal leeway12, thus we rounded the average reading time to the closest 
higher natural number; the response deadline was therefore set to 4 seconds. 
Reading pre-test Study 2. Half of the participants were presented with four response 
options in Study 2. Since reading through more options will in itself take more time, we decided 
to run a new reading pre-test with the 4-option format. To this end an additional 23 participants 
were recruited (16 female, mean age = 40.8 years, SD = 15.2 years) via Crowdflower. They 
received $0.10 for participation. A total of 48% of the participants reported high school as 
highest completed educational level, and 52% reported having a post-secondary education 
degree. As in Study 1, the four response options in the pre-test were randomly generated 
numbers. Except for the number of response options the pre-test was completely similar to the 2-
option Study 1 pre-test. Participants were also presented with the same verification questions, 
which were correctly solved by 74.9% of the participants. Only data from participants who 
responded correctly to both verification questions was analysed. Prior to reaction time analysis, 
raw reaction times were log-transformed. Mean and standard deviations were calculated on the 
log-transformed data, and they were back-transformed after calculation. The mean reading time 
in the pre-test sample was 4.3 s (SD = 2 s). As in Study 1, we rounded the deadline to nearest 
higher natural number. Hence, the time limit in the 4-option format was set to 5 s (vs 4 s in the 2-
option format).   
 
  
                                                             
12 This also helped to account for minor language differences since participants in the main study would solve 
Hungarian translations of the English problems.  
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E. Additional analyses and data 
 
Table S7. Frequency of direction of change categories in study 1-5 for the first conflict problem that participants 
solved only. Raw number of trials are in brackets. 
Study  Response 
format 
Direction of change category Non-
correction 
(11/11+01) 
 
11 
 
00 
 
10 
 
01 
Study1 2 response 5.7% (5) 71.6% (63) 6.8% (6) 15.9% (14) 26% 
Study2a 2 response 4.2% (7) 89.2% (148) 2.4% (4) 4.2% (7) 50% 
Study2b 4 response 8.1% (12) 89.2% (132) - 2.7% (4) 75% 
Study3a 2 response 2.4% (1) 69.1% (29) 9.5% (4) 19.1% (8) 11% 
Study3b 4 response 9.3% (4) 76.7% (33) - 14% (6) 40% 
Study4 Free response 10% (4) 85% (34) - 5% (2) 66.7% 
Study5 Free response 9.1% (4) 68.2% (30) - 22.7% (10) 29% 
 
Average 
 
2 response 4.4% (13) 81.1% (240)  4.7% (14) 9.8% (29) 30.1% 
4 response 8.4% (16) 86.4% (165) - 5.2% (10) 61.5% 
Free response 9.5% (8) 76.2% (64) - 14.3% (12) 40% 
 
Overall average 6.5% (37) 82.1% (469) 2.5% (14) 8.9% (51) 42% 
 
  
 
Table S8. Frequency of each direction of change category for the first conflict item only in the justification studies 
(Study 6-7). Raw number of trials are in brackets. 
Study  Response 
format 
Direction of change category Non-
correction 
(11/11+01) 
 
11 
 
00 
 
10 
 
01 
Study 6 2 response 8.2% (4) 53.1% (26) 16.3% (8) 22.5% (11) 26.7% 
Study 7a 2 response 18.8% (9) 58.3% (28) 10.4% (5) 12.5% (6) 60% 
Study 7b Free response 12.5% (7) 44.6% (25) 1.8% (1) 41.1% (23) 23.3% 
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Table S9. Frequency of conflict problem justifications for different direction of change categories in Study 6 and 7 
(raw number of justifications in brackets). 
Study  Justificati
on 
Initial response Final response 
 11 00 10 01 11 00 10 01 
Study 6 
2 response 
Correct 
math 
30% (6) - - 7.1% (1) 55% (11) 
6.7% (3) 
- 69.2% (9) 
Incorrect 
math 
- 25.5% (12) - 21.4% (3) - 
37.8% (17) 
11.1% (1) - 
Unspecified 
math 
- 19.1% (9) - - 5% (1) 
37.8% (17) 
77.8% (7) 7.7% (1) 
Hunch 5% (1) 4.3% (2) - 14.3% (2) 5% (1) - - 7.7% (1) 
Guess 20% (4) 10.6% (5) 66.7% (6) 7.1% (1) 5% (1) 4.4% (2) - - 
Previous  30% (6) 6.4% (3) - 7.1% (1) 10% (2) 2.2% (1) - - 
Other 15% (3) 34% (16) 33.3% (3) 42.9% (6) 20% (4) 11.1% (5) 11.1% (1) 15.4% (2) 
          
Study 7 
2 response 
 
 
 
 
Correct 
math 
12.5% (2) 2.3% (1) - - 93.8% (15) 2.3% (1) - 100% (10) 
Incorrect 
math 
- 40.1% (18) - 20% (2) - 65.9% (29) 83.3% (5) - 
Unspecified 
math 
12.5% (2) 11.4% (5) - - 6.3% (1) 18.2% (8) - - 
Hunch 56.3% (9) 22.7% (10) 16.7% (1) 50% (5) -  2.3% (1) - - 
Guess 18.8% (3) 22.7% (10) 83.3% (5) 30% (3) - 11.4% (5) - - 
Other - - - - - - 16.7% (1) - 
          
Study 7 
Free 
response 
 
 
 
 
 
Correct 
math 
30.8% (4) - - - 84.6% (11) 2.3% (1) - 93.3% (28) 
Incorrect 
math 
- 46.5% 20 - 26.7% (8) - 69.8% (30) 50% (1) - 
Unspecified 
math 
7.7% (1) 7% (3) - - 7.7% (1) 16.3% (7) 50% (1) 3.3% (1) 
Hunch 38.5% (5) 23.3% (10) 100% (2) 40% (12) - 4.7% (2) - - 
Guess 15.4% (2) 21% (9) - 26.7% (8) - 7% (3) - - 
Other 7.7% (1) 2.3% (1) - 6.7% (2) 7.7% (1) - - 3.3% (1) 
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Table S10. Frequency of “11” stability on conflict items in Study 1-5. The raw number of participants for each value 
is presented between brackets. 
Study Response 
format 
Stability index value Average 
stability <33% 50% 66% 75% 100% 
Study1 2 response 18.2% (4) 18.2% (4) 22.7% (5) 22.7% (5) 18.2% (4) 65.2% 
Study2a 2 response 23.1% (3) 30.8% (4) 7.7% (1) - 38.5% (5) 66% 
Study2b 4 response 38.1% (8) 9.5% (2) 9.5% (2) 4.8% (1) 38.1% (8) 64.3% 
Study3a 2 response 18.2% (2) 36.4% (4) 9.1% (1) 36.4% (4) - 57.6% 
Study3b 4 response 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 33.3% (4) 8.3% (1) 33.3% (4) 70.8% 
Study4 Free response - 16.7% (1) 33.3% (2) - 50% (3) 80.6% 
Study5 Free response 5.6% (1) 33.3% (6) 16.7% (3) 22.2% (4) 22.2% (4) 68.1% 
 
Average 
 
2 response 19.6% (9) 26.1% (12) 15.2% (7) 19.6% (9) 19.6% (9) 63.6% 
4 response 30.3% (10) 9.1% (3) 18.2% (6) 6.1% (2) 36.4% (12) 66.7% 
Free response 4.2% (1) 29.2% (7) 20.8% (5) 16.7% (4) 29.2% (7) 71.2% 
 
Overall average 19.4% (20) 21.4% (22) 17.5% (18) 14.6% (15) 27.2% (28) 66.3% 
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A. Initial response Confidence 
B. Final response confidence  
 
 
Figure S1. Mean initial (A.) and final (B.) conflict problem response confidence ratings averaged across Study 1-5. 
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
 
